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Abstract 
Application of the material balance principle to nuclear material safeguards 
means comparison at the end of an inventory period of the book inventory, i.e. 
the amount of nuclear material which should be in the plant, with the real 
inventory, i.e. the amount actually found in the plant. By definition a statement 
about non-diversion or diversion can only be made at the end of the inventory 
period, which means that the detection time is determined by the length of that 
period. The question arises of the appropriate length of an inventory period. 
If one has in mind a fixed reference time, e.g. one year, this question is 
identical with the question of the appropriate number of inventories per 
reference time. 
In this paper optimal test procedures for a sequence of inventory periods will 
be discussed. Starting with a game theoretical description of the conflict 
situation between the plant operator and the inspector, the objectives of the 
inspector as well as the general decision theoretical problern will be formulated. 
In the first part the objective of "secure" detection will be emphasized which 
means that only at the end of the reference time a decision is taken by the 
inspector. In the second part the objective of "timely" detection will be 
emphasized which will lead to sequential test procedures. At the end of the 
paper all procedures will be summarized, and in view of the multitude of pro-
cedures available at the moment some comments about future work will be given. 
Analyse von Entscheidungsprozeduren für eine Folge von Inventurperioden 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Anwendung des Materialbilanzierungsprinzips auf Problerne der Überwachung 
des kerntechnischen Materials beinhaltet den Vergleich des Buchinventars, d.h. 
der Materialrnenge, die in der Anlage sein sollte, mit dem realen Inventar, 
d.h. der Materialrnenge, die arn Ende einer Inventurperiode wirklich in der An-
lage gefunden wird. Da per definitionern eine Aussage über mögliche Material-
entwendung nur arn Ende einer Inventurperiode gernacht werden kann, bedeutet 
dies, daß die Entdeckungszeit durch die Länge der Inventurperiode bestimmt 
wird, was die Frage nach der geeigneten Länge einer Inventurperiode aufwirft. 
Denkt man an eine bestimmte Referenzzeit, z.B. ein Jahr, so ist diese Frage 
gleichbedeutend mit der Frage nach der geeigneten Zahl von Inventuren in der 
Referenzzeit. 
In dieser Arbeit werden optimale Testverfahren für eine Folge von Inventur-
perioden diskutiert. Ausgehend von einer spieltheoretischen Formulierung des 
Konflikts zwischen Anlagehetreiber und Inspektor werden die Ziele des Inspek-
tors und das allgerneine entscheidungstheoretische Problern formuliert. Im ersten 
Teil wird das Ziel "sichere" Entdeckung betont, was bedeutet, daß vorn Inspektor 
erst arn Ende der Referenzzeit eine Entscheidung getroffen wird. Im zweiten Teil 
wird das Ziel "rechtzeitige" Entdeckung betont, was zu sequentiellen Testver-
fahren führt. Am Ende der Arbeit werden alle Verfahren zusammengestellt, und 
es werden angesichts der Vielfalt der gegenwärtig verfügbaren Verfahren einige 
Bemerkungen zu zukünftigen Arbeiten gemacht. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of material accountability as applied to nuclear material safe-
guards may be described as follows: At the beginning of an inventory period 
[t
0
, t 1], the real or physical inventory I 0 in the material balance area under 
consideration is measured. In the interval [t
0
, t 1] the net transfers T1 are 
measured which give together with I
0 
the so-called book inventory B1 = I 0 + T1 
at the time t 1, i.e. the amount of material which should be in the material 
balance area. This book inventory is compared with the real inventory I 1 at t 1, 
i.e. the inventory which is actually found in the material balance area. If no 
material has been lost or diverted (null hypothesis H ), and if there have been 
0 
no measurement errors, the difference 
should be zero; if, on the contrary, the amount M1 has been lost or diverted, 
the difference should just be M1 (alternative hypothesis H1). Because of the 
random measurement errors the distributions of which are assumed to be known 
by long term experience, this will not exactly be true. Therefore, in order to 
decide whether or not a difference greater than zero can be explained by 
measurement errors, a significance test has to be performed with the two hypo-
theses that the expected value of the difference z1 is either zero or M1 > O, 
in formulae: 
In this paper a reference time [t , t J is considered, at the beginning t 
o n o 
and at the end t of which real inventories are taken, and during which the 
n 
additional n-1 real inventories I.,i=J, •.• ,n-1 are taken. Thus, n book physical 
1 
inventory differences Z. := I.+l + T. -I., i=l, ... ,n can be performed by which 
1 1 1 1 
it shall be decided whether or not material has been lost or diverted in the 
interval of time [t, t ]. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss optimal 
o n 
test procedures, one major issue being the question of the proper optimization 
criterion. 
- 6 -
It should be ernphasized that in the following paragraphs all test procedures 
are exclusively based on the source variables Z.,i=l, ... ,n. This means that 
1. 
neither an information about single real inventories or net transfers is used, 
nor are these inventories or transfers estimated. This is in line with the goal 
of international nuclear material safeguards, i.e. the early detection of any 
diversion (or prevention by the risk of early detection, IAEO (1971)) which is 
our subject; for plant operations management it might be very reasonable to use 
the detailed information. We will come back to this point on several occasions. 
If the operator wants to divert material - this has to be assumed for technical 
analytical reasons and should not be considered as a prejudice against any 
operator or state - it has to be assumed that he will do this in such a way 
that his "risk" is minimized so as to be on the safe side. On the other hand, 
the inspector should choose such a test procedure that his "success" of detect-
l.ng a diversion is maximized. Thus, we are led to the analysis of a conflict 
situation with the game theory as its appropriate tool. 
Game theoretical analyses of the nuclear material safeguards problern have been 
performed since 1968 (see e.g. Avenhaus (1978), Siri et al. (1978), Bennet et 
al. (1979)). These analyses have been criticized from various sides, essentially 
with the argument that they call for the knowledge of values of payoff para-
meters which will never be available, and that therefore traditional statistic-
al tools have to be used, working simply with error probabili ties of the first 
and second kinds. The analysts working in the nuclear material safeguards 
project of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center took efforts and succeeded to 
show that the game theory represents the only way to appropriately formulate 
the objectives of safeguards and, furthermore, to show under which assumptions 
which results can be obtained that are independent of the payoff parameter 
values, thus establishing a link between the overall objective and traditional 
statistical procedures. This will be demonstrated in this paper, too, for the 
concrete problern of inventory sequences, even though today this basic issue is 
no longer discussed. 
A "Review of the Application of Strategie Analysis to Material Account-
ing" by C.A. Bennett et al. (1979) was a "Consensus Report of the Peer 
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Review Group" established to answer five questions on the applicability 
of game theoretical methods to material accounting. Question I was "Does 
the use of game theory provide a viable analytical tool for the safeguards 
problems in general?", and question 5 "What are the disadvantages and 
benefits of using game theory?". The group members based their findings 
primarily on the paper by Siri et al. (1978) in which a payoff function 
was used which in our opinion does not adequately describe the problern of 
international nuclear material safeguards and which, by the way, made the 
results highly dependent on the values of the payoff parameters. Although 
two papers of the Karlsruhe group (Avenhaus and Frick (1974 a,b)) were 
mentioned in the literature review of the said group, they apparently did 
not play a major role in its deliberations. Therefore, the group as a 
whole expressed some reservation with respect to the practical and 
immediate applicability of game theoretical methods but nevertheless came 
to generally positive conclusions in the sense of our remarks above. 
As already mentioned, the objective of international nuclear material safe-
guards is the early detection of the diversion of significant amounts of 
fissile material. This means, technically speaking, that the diversion of a 
given amount of material (the so-called goal quantity) should be detected as 
early as possible with as high a probability of detection as possible. As we 
will see, these two objectives may be conflicting such that a tradeoff between 
them has to be made. In addition, it has not been stated explicitly, but it 
has to be concluded from the boundary condition of the lowest possible plant 
disturbance by safeguards measures that the false ala~ probability must not 
exceed a given value. 
In the years after the formulation of safeguards objectives and procedures, 
i.e. in the years after 1971, the analyses centered araund the problern of 
finding safeguards procedures and evaluation techniques which optimized the 
overall probability of detection for a reference time. Only in recent years 
the aspect of short detection time - which, as we will see, is even difficult 
to formulate as a technical optimization criterion - came to the forefront 
of investigations. According to this development and since this classification 
is natural, this paper is divided into two basic parts. 
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In the first part the statia approaah will be described: It is assumed that 
only at the end of the reference time [t , t ] a final decision will be taken 
o n 
whether or not material has been diverted. 
It should be noted that at the first aation ZeveZ it is only decided 
whether or not the null hypothesis is accepted. There will be several 
further action levels before a final decision about diversion will be 
taken. As we consider in this paper only the first level of action, we 
say instead of "accepting the alternative hypothesis" in a somewhat 
simplifying manner "stating a diversion". 
This is in the sense of the objective of achieving a high overall probability 
of detection. In this approach the safeguards goal of "early detection" of a 
diversion plays the role of a boundary aondition the weight of which has to be 
determined by practical arguments. 
In the second part the sequentiaZ approaah will be described: It is assumed 
that after each inventory taking during the reference time it will be decided 
whether or not material has been diverted, and that plant operations will be 
stopped immediately in the first case. This is in the sense of the objective of 
achieving a short detection time in case of diversion. This approach is much 
more difficult, both from a practical and a theoretical point of view: The 
practitioner has to say how much more important it is for the inspector to 
detect a diversion already after the i-th inventory rather than detecting it 
after the i+lst inventory only. The theoretician, on the other hand, is confront-
ed with much more serious analytical problems. 
In this connection the notion of the abrupt diversion of a large amount of 
nuclear material in one inventory period has to be introduced; in fact, the 
analysis of sequential test procedures has been emphasized for exactly this 
reason, namely to provide tools for the timely detection of abrupt diversion. 
On the contrary, static test procedures serve primarily the purpose of 
detecting protraated diversion of nuclear material. As the inspector never 
knows which diversion strategy will be used, if nuclear material will be diver-
ted, in this paper we discuss - wherever possible - the efficiency of the test 
procedures with respect to both these diversion strategies. 
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lt has already been said that the purpose of this paper is to give an over-
vLew of the test procedures developed in recent years, especially to precisely 
list their underlying assumptions and to determine their relative advantages 
and shortcomings with respect to the safeguards objectives. Naturally, there 
remain many questions to be solved in the future, both practical and theore-
tical ones. Except for these open questions, there are several aspects of the 
whole area which have not been tackled in this paper, some of which will be 
mentioned in the following paragraphs. 
First, no attempt has been made to give a complete list of all test procedures 
considered so far in the literature. Some of them have been developed only 
for special loss strategies and cannot be generalized to cover more compli-
cated ones, others are only slight modifications of procedures discussed here 
which have been adapted to computational requirements (e.g. the so-called 
V-mask techniques which represent only special variants of the CUMUF tests). 
Second, this paper does not deal with the problern of estimating losses or the 
amount of diverted material. These problems have attracted considerable 
interest since the theory of Kalman filters (see e.g. Sage and Melsa (1971)) 
has been applied in this area in order to define "best solutions" and to find 
algorithms for their numerical calculation (Pike and Morrison (1977, 1979)). 
The reason for not considering problems of estimation in this paper is that 
the problern of detecting losses or diversion is basically a test prohlem, not 
an estimation problem. Estimation theory may provide test statistics in those 
cases where best tests cannot be found (see e.g. Stewart et al. (1979), 
Sellinschegg (1980)) - in fact we will consider such a situation in section 
1.3. However, in this paper the general intention has been to formulate the 
basic problern with the help of first principles, and these are provided by the 
test theory. 
Third, the very important problern of Verification has not been discussed, 
although it is clear that one criterion for the practical application of 
procedures in international safeguards is their verifiability. One reason for 
this is that so far only the problern of verifying the data of one inventory 
period has been·analyzed theoretically (Avenhaus and Beedgen (1980), Beedgen 
and Neu (1980)); another reason is that especially these problems cannot be 
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solved without taking into account concrete plant and measurement conditions 
and, furthermore, that at the moment they are of a more constructive than 
analytical nature (requirement for tamper-proof instruments, data transmission 
lines, etc.). 
A final word should be said about the mathematical-statistical tools which 
have been used in this paper and which were necessary to represent appropriate-
ly the problems and their solutions. Even though more complicated proofs are 
not given, the reader should be familiar with the elements of statistics and 
decision theory (e.g. at the level of Brownlee's book or, in view of nuclear 
material accountancy, at the level of the IAEA Technical Manual, Part F (1980)), 
The formal definitions, derivations and proofs, which have been given appear 
to be absolutely necessary for understanding the nature of the problern and of 
the corresponding mathematical models developed in the last ten years. To 
facilitate this understanding, emphasis has been laid on the use of standard 
statistical terminology; furthermore, at the end of this paper a list of the 
more important symbols used throughout this paper will be given. 
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PART I 
The Static Approach 
In this part it will be assumed that the operator decides at the beginning of 
the reference time whether or not he will divert material, and if yes, which 
amount he will divert in each inventory period. Furthermore, it will be 
assumed that the inspector decides at the beginning of the reference time 
which test procedure he will choose in order to make a Statement at the end 
of the referenae time whether or not the operator has diverted material. 
The assumption that the inspector will not perform the single material balance 
tests at the moment at which the data are available to him, but only at the 
end of the reference time, is the most important assumption in this part; 
it expresses the fact that the main safeguards objective of the inspector is 
to detect a diversion with as high a 11 security 11 as possible. Moreover, it seems 
to be justified by the fact that plant operations will not be stopped as soon 
as the book physical differences for a single inventory period are significant. 
Any game theoretical analysis of a conflict situation has to start with the 
definition of the payoffs to the players for the various outcomes of the game. 
Let the pair of payoffs to the inspector as player 1 and to the operator as 
player 2 be defined by 
(-a, -b) in case of diversion and detection 
(-c, d) in case of diversion and no detection 
(-e' -f) in case of no diversion and 11detection 11 (false alarm) 
(0, 0) in case of no diversion and no detection, 
where (a, b, c, d, e, f) > (0, ... ,0), where a < c, i.e. the inspector's loss 
in case of detected diversion is smaller than his loss in case of not detected 
diversion, and where b > f, i.e. the operator's loss in case of detected 
diversion is greater than his loss in case of a false alarm. 
The true gains and losses of the inspector can hardly be quantified; we assume 
that the inspection effort is small compared to these quantities. Therefore, 
it is not part of the payoffs but is treated as a parameter of the set of 
inspector's strategies the value of which is determined a priori. Also it is 
assumed that the payoff of the operator is independent of the total amount of 
diverted material (which might be different in case of subnational diversion). 
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The notion "false alarm" needs an explanation. In the framework of the one-
level safeguards procedure considered so far there is no possibility of 
correcting a false accusation. The inspector knows that according to the 
choice of the value of the false alarm probability a false alarm is raised 
with this probability; he can, however, not decide in the actual situation of 
an alarm whether or not this alarm is justified. Therefore, in this framework 
a "false alarm" does not exist, but only an "alarm". It is clear that especially 
in the case of international safeguards such a simple procedure will not be 
accepted in practice. In case of an alarm a "second action level" must follow 
which should permit to clarify whether or not data were falsified. There are no 
precise procedures; if they existed, a mathematical treatment of such a two-
level procedure would have to take into account that the safeguards measures at 
the second level could have an impact on the behavior of the two players at the 
first level. In the following paragraphs, we will not analyze these possibil-
ities in further detail but only assume that there are possibilities for 
clarifying false alarms and, furthermore, that these possibilities do not 
influence the player's behavior at the first level. 
Let 1-ß be the probability that a diversion is detected and let a be the 
probability that the inspector states a diversion if in fact the operator 
behaves legally. The conditionaZ expected payoffs to the inspector and to the 
operator are 
(-a· (1-ß)-c·ß, -b. (1-ß)+d·ß) in case of diversion 
(-e·a, -f•a) in case of no diversion. 
If the operator diverts material with the probability pE[ü,l], the expected 
payoffs are defined by 
I:= (-a+(a-c)•ß)·p-e•a• (1-p) for the inspector, 
B:= (-b+(b+d)·ß)•p-f·a· (1-p) for the operator. 
The operator who wants - if at all - to divert the amount of material M > 0, 
has the set of strategies 
{p}® YM:= {p:pE[ü,l]}® {(M 1, ... ,M ): L:M.=M}. n . 1 
1 
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The set of strategies of the inspector for the moment is simply called 
X:= {x}. The dependence of the probability of detection 1-ß, the false alarm 
probability a and the expected payoff functions of the strategies are denoted 
by ß(x;y), a(x), I(x;p,y) and B(x;p,y), respectively. 
As we assume that in international safeguards a cooperative behavior between 
the operator and the inspector with the goal of concealing diversion can be 
excluded, we are led to a non-cooperative, two-person game which is character-
ized by the sets of strategies and the function pair of payoff to the two 
players, which we therefore denote by the quadruple 
The solution of this game is given by the so-called equiLihrium point 
(x*; p*, y*) which is defined by 
I(x*;p*,y*) > I(x;p*,y*) 
B(x*;p*,y*) > B(x*;p,y). 
It is important now that this equilibrium point can be determined by a two 
step procedure consisting of the solution of the following two games: 
Theorem 1 
Equilibrium points of the game (X,{p}® YM,I,B) with sets of strategies as defi-
ned above can be obtained by determining the equilibrium points of the following 
auxiliary games: 
I. A twu-person zero sum game (X , Y , 1-ß) where X is defined by 
a M a 
{x:xEX, a fixed}. The optimal strategies of this game, x*(a) and y*, are 
the saddle points of 1-ß Oll xa ® YM' defined by 
1-ß(x*(a),y,a) > 1-ß(x*(a),y*,a) > 1-ß(x(a),y*,a) for aE[ü,1]. (>'<) 
2. A non-cooperative two-person game ({a}, {p}, I, B) with 
ß'\'(a):= ß(x*(a),y*,a), where x*EX~ and y*EYM are the solutions of the 
first game. The optimal strategies a* and p* of this game are given by 
(-a+(a-c)•ß*(a*))•p*-e•a*· (1-p*) > (-a+(a-c)·ß*(a))•p*-e·a· (1-p*) 
(-b+(b+d)·ß*(a*))·p*-e•a*· (1-p*) > (-b+(b+d)·ß*(a*))·p-e·a*• (1-p). 
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Proof 
From the left hand inequality of (*) 1 and since a < c 1 we get 
(-a+(a-c)•ß(x*(a),y*,a))•p*-e·a· (1-p*) > (-a+(a-c)·ß(x(a),y*,a))·p*-e·a· (1-p*) 
for arbitrary values of p'~1 s(O, I) and aE(O, 1). Therefore, we get with the upper 
inequality (**) 
(-a+(a-c)•ß(x*(u*),y*,a*))·p*-e·a*· (1-p*) > (-a+(a-c)·ß(x(a),y*,a))·p*-e·a· (1-p*) 
for arbitrary values of a and p*. In .the same way we have 
(-b+(b+d)•ß(x*(a*),y*,a*))•p*-f·a*· (1-p*) > (-b+(b+d)·ß*(x*(a*),y,a*))·p-f·a*· (1-p) 
for ~rbitrary values of a* and p. This, however, means that (x*(a*),y*,p*) is 
in fact an equilibrium point of the game (X 1 {p}®YM 1 I 1 B). n 
Theorem 2 (Avenhaus and Frick (1977)) 
The noncooperative two person game ({a} 1 {p} 1 I 1 B) 1 defined in Theorem 11 has 
exactly one equilibrium point (a* 1 p*) 1 if ß*(a) is convex and differentiable 
on (0 1 1) 1 and if the function -b+(b+d) • ß(a)+f • a has exactly one root in [0 1 1]. 
It is solution of the following two equations 
d f•a*-b+(b+d) •ß(a*) = 0 1 (e+(a-c) 'da* ß(a*)) •p*-1=0, 
Besides the technical advantage this two-step procedure offers, it also has a 
very important substantial consequence: It has already been mentioned that the 
values of the payoff parameters a, ... ,b can hardly be estimated. However, we 
see that if we fix the value of the false alarm probability and consider only 
the illegal game, we must consider only a two-person zero sum game with the 
probability of detection as payoff to the inspector. 
For the rest of this part, we will only consider the first step game. 
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So far, apparently only one further concrete game theoretical model for 
the problern of one inventory period has been published (Siri et al. 
(1978)). These authors formulate a two person zero sum game with the 
payoff 
ß + c • y + x - b • min (x, y) + e • I x - y I 
to the operator, where 
ß 
X 
y 
c . y 
= 
= 
-
= 
clean out inventory cost (fixed cost) 
amount diverted by the operator 
estimate of the inspector of amount diverted, 
recovery search cost (variable cost), 
b•min(y,x)= value to inspector of assurance, or recovery of material 
diverted, 
e • I y - x I - error penal ty from wrang estima te of inspector. 
According to the considerations given so far, this model is not suited 
for practical application, because 
in case of a false alarm, the objectives of the two players are at 
most partially conflicting, and 
the optimal strategy of the inspector, i.e., the significance threshold 
of the MUF-test, depends heavily on the values of the payoff parame-
ters. 
To enable the inspector to decide at the end of the reference time whether or 
not the operator has diverted material, he needs a deaision rule. Adecision 
rule o is defined as a map of the space of observations Z into the interval 
[o, 1] and may be interpreted as the conditional probability of choosing the 
null hypothesis H : 
0 
If only the decisions H
0 
or H1 are permitted, we have 
A A 
o(H0 i~) + o(H 1 i~) for all ~sZ, ( *) 
which means that, if we decide with the probability o for H0 we decide with 
the probability 1-o for H1• 
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In case of 
if Ze:Z if Ze:Z 
-;;;;- 0 A" 0 
if ~e:z 1 , if Ze:Z 1 
we call the decision rule a non-randomized test; it is simply characterized 
by the acceptance region Z or, alternatively, by the critical region 
0 
z1 = Z\Z 0 • 
Let f (z), defined by 
o-
be the probability density of ~ under H
0
, and correspondingly f 1 (~) the 
probability density under H1. Then the false alarm probability a is given by 
Similarly, the probability of detection is given by 
I-ß = fo(H 1 1~)·f 1 (~)d~. z 
In case of non-randomized tests, these expressions reduce to 
In the following paragraphs we will characterize the non-randomized tests by 
their acceptance regions; only in Section 1.1, where we determine the Neyman-
Pearson test, we have to make fUll use of the f,.ormalism developed so far. 
Before discussing various test procedures in the framewerk of this static app 
proach, it has to be emphasized that the use of a series of MUF-variables 
does not mean that a decision is made once a specific MUF-value is observed: 
The decision, whether or not any of the two hypotheses is accepted or rejected, 
is only made at the end of the reference time. Naturally, in case of the n-fold 
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test procedure discussed in Section 1.4, this does not exclude the possibili-
ty to investigate, when the first significance occured, in order to locate the 
lass or diversion in time. 
1.1 The Neyman-Pearson Test 
If the distribution functions under the null and under the alternative hypo-
theses are specified, then the best test in the sense of the probability of the 
error second kind ( overall probability of no detection in one case) for a fixed 
probability of the error first kind (false alarm probability in our case) is the 
Neyman-Pearson test, the acceptance region of which is given by 
Theorem 3: Lemma of Neyman and Pearson (1933) 
Given the random vector _z, the density function of which is f (z) under H 0- 0 
and f 1 (~ under a1 • Then the acceptance region z:P ofthat test, which minimi-
zes the probability of the error second kind for a fixed probability of the error 
first kind, is given by 
NP { f1 (~_) 
z 0 = ~1 : f1Z) :s; 
o-
where the value of A is determined with the help of the probability of the error 
of the first kind. 
Proof (after Shipley (1980)) 
According to the terminology introduced at the beginning of this part one has 
to determine the free minimum of the expression 
where A is a Lagrange multiplier. With 
1-o(H lz) 
o-
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this is equivalent to determining the free minimum of the expression 
A' (1-a) + J[f 1 (~) - A • f0 (~)]o(H0 ~)d~. z 
As we have 0 $ Ö(H \z) $ 1, we minimize this expression, in case we choose 
o-
Ö(H \z) = 1 if the integrand is negative and Ö(H \z) = 0 if it is positive. 
o- o-
Therefore the Neyman-Pearson test has the acceptance region given above. U 
In the following we consider two different diversion scenarios. First, we ana-
lyze the possibility that during the reference time [t ,t ] the diversion of 
o n 
the total amount M of material will be spread over the whole reference time, we 
call this protracted diversion. Second, the possibility that during the referen-
ce time [t ,t ] the total amount M of material will be diverted in such a way 
o n 
that with probability q,, r q, =1, it will be diverted in the i-th inventory 
l. i l. 
period. We call this abrupt diversion. It is noted already here that only the 
first szenario leads to a simple solution. 
Protracted diversion 
The application of the Lemma of Neyman and Pearson leads in this case to a re-
sult which we formulate as 
Theorem 4 (Avenhaus and Jaech (1981), Zerrweck (1981)) 
Given the random vector ~' defined in the introduction, with covariance Matrix ~' 
and with expectation vector 
E(Z) = 0 under H and E(_Z) = ~' ~· ·~ = M, under H 1 • 
- - 0 
Let ö be a test for these two hypotheses with fixed fals alarm probability a 
and probability of detection 1 - ß0 (~) • 
Then the power 1 - ßö** , defined by 
6** = { : 
for e '• X > k 
- - a 
otherwise, 
where ka is the significance threshold, fulfills the relations 
here, ~(.) is the normal distribution function, 
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«3>(x) 1 = --. 
V2ri 
X t2 J exp (- 2 ) dt , 
-oo 
an~ U its inverse. 
Proof 
According to our assumptions the density functions f
0 
and f 1 are expliditely 
given by 
f (z) I -1 exp (- I • z 1 • E • ~), 
o-
f I(~) 
where g is the covariance matrix of ~. 
~-== cov(Z,Z 1 ) = (cov(Z.,Z.)) , 
-- l. J 
-I E 
the critical region of the Neyman-Pearson test is given by 
which means that the test statistic is given by 
z I • E-I • M 
As this linear form of multivariate normally distributed random variables is 
normally distributed with expectation values 
-I E(Z•E ·M) 
- = -
0 under H and 
0 
-I E(Z I ·E •M) 
- = -
and with the variance 
-1 -1 var(~ 1 ·g ·~) = ~ 1 ·g •M, 
-I M1 •E •M under H1 
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see e.g. Anderson (1958), the false alarm probability a, defined by 
is given by 
<I> (- s ) 
f -1 
v'M'·L: •M 
where s is the significance threshold of the test, and where 
I x t2 
<iJ(x) :=- f exp(- -z)dt 
/2; -oo 
is the normal distribution function. 
The probability of detection, defined by 
is given by 
By elimination of the significance threshold with the help of its relation to 
the false alarm probability, one gets 
where U is the inverse function of the normal distribution function ~. 
As w(.) is a monotone function, the minimum of the probability of detection is 
given by the minimum of the scalar form 
-1 M' • g • M 
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We determine the minimum of this form under the boundary condition 
~M. = e 1 •M 
i ~ 
M>O, e':= (1 ••• 1), 
with the help of the Lagrange formalism: The free minimum of the form 
M1 • ~-I • M + /.. e 1 • M 
= 
/.. being the Lagrange parameter, is given by the condition 
2 · M* 1 • ~-I + /.. • e 1 0, 
Multiplication from right by ~ gives 
2 • M*~ + /.. • e 1 o. 
Multiplication from right by e and use of the boundary condition gives 
2 • M + /.. • e 1 • ~ e o, 
therefore, elimination of /.. gives 
M* M , ~·e 
=-
and the minimum of the probability of detection is 
min (1-ßNP)=: 1-ß~ 
M:e 1 •M=H 
~ ( M - ui ). 
/e 1 • ~ •e -a 
=-
Now, as one immediately sees, we have 
e 1 • ~ • e var (e 1 • ~). 
As we have E(~ 1 ·~) = M under H1, the minimum of 1-ßNP is in fact the probabil-
ity of detection based on the test statistics 
e 1 • z ~z. 
i ~ 
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i.e. the test based onZy on the beginning and ending inventories and on the 
net transfers. 
Now, let 8 be a test characterized by the test statistic e' ·X. As this test 
0 . - -
has the samepower for all ~ satisfying the condition ~··~ = M, we have 
min(l-ß 0 (!:)) {v} o 
Now we have in general 
therefore, 
(*) 
Furthermore, we have in general 
min sup(l-ß 0(v)) > sup min(l-ß 0(v)). {v} {o} - {o} {v} 
(**) 
From (*) and (lb':), however, we get equity of both sides which completes 
the proof. 
The following theorem shows that one obtains the same result if one considers 
instead of the original random vector X a linearly transformed vector: 
Theorem 5 
D 
Let ~ be a normally distributed random vector with regular known covariance 
matrix ~' and let Y = ~·~ be a linearly transformed vector with regular trans-
formation matrix A. Then Theorem 1 holds also if the test procedure is based 
on the transformed vector Y instead of the original vector X. 
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Proof 
As the expectation vector of Y is 
E(Y) = 0 under H0 and E(~) A·H_ under H1 , 
and as the covariance matrix of Y is 
A var(~,~') A·'E·A' 
= = = 
the Neyman Pearson test statistic of the test for fixed H. is given by 
-1 Y'·A ·A•J.l , 
- = =-
and the power of this test is g1ven by 
As we see immediately, we have 
thus, we have the same expression as for the test using the original random 
vector X. 
D 
Theorem 4 and also Theorem 5~ which is in fact a special case of the former 
one, show that the best test in the sense of Neyman and Pearson uses only the 
beginning and ending inventories and the net transfers, i.e., it ignores inter-
mediate inventories. In other words, in the sense of the overall probability 
of detection criterion it is best to test only the book physical inventory 
of the reference time interval difference I +'ET1-I at the end point t o i n n 
[t 't J . o n 
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It should be emphasized that this result is based on the operator's best 
strategy ~* given above (even though the inspector does not take any notice 
of it, as he performs only one test at the end of the reference time!). If the 
operator chooses a different strategy, the probability of detection will 
become higher by definition. 
On the other hand, the inspector could get a better result if he knew the 
strategy M: e'·M = M of the operator: In this case his test statistics would be 
~'·g- 1 ·~,~hich-would lead to a probability of detection as given above. 
For equal diversion in each inventory period, 
M 
we would get 
Let us consider the case n=2. With 
( cri p•cr •crj I 2 L: 2 p•cr ·cr (j2 I 2 
we get 
2 
-1 I (MI M'·L: ·M=--·-
- = - 2 2 1-p (j I 
e' · L: • e 
- =-
M* 
M 
e 
n 
L: 
-I 
= 
I 
2 __ P_ 
I (jl (jl•(j2 
--2 I __ P_ 1-p 2 (jl•(j2 (j2 
+ p•cr ·cr ) I 2 
+ p•crl·cr2 
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Thus for M* ~ M* which is true for 
' I r 2 
2 2 M 
cri -f a2 , and MI = M2 = 2 the test statistic 
Z'·g-I•Z- which takes into account 
detection for all values of cr~, a~, 
II - leads to a higher probability of 
e' 
which is equivalent to 
p as we always have 
-I g e >---
e' ·~·e 
=-
I I I 2 2 
4 --2. 22 (a I - 2·p·cr ·cr + cr2) > 2 2 I 2 I-p +2·p·cr •cr +cr a I·a2 cri I 2 2 
which is equivalent to 
which is always true. 
Finally, it should be noted that Shipley (I980) has treated the problern of 
the optimal nurober of inventory periods in a static approach as follows: 
He defines the random vector ~ by 
and the 2n+I x n matrix f; by 
A' = 
= 
and writes the two hypotheses 
Z' (I I I ... I TI ... T ) 
o n n 
-I 0 ... 0 I 0 0 
0 I -I •.. 0 0 I 0 
0 0 .•. I -I 0 o ... I 
~
n+I n 
H and HI as 0 
n 
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H:A'·E(Z) 0 
0 = 0 -
where ~ is a constant n x 2n+I matrix and D is an unknown vector with n 
elements. Especially Q may correspond to our ~' and ~ to 
I 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 
0 I ... 0 • 
0 0 ••• I 0 ... 0 
It should be noted that Stewart et al. (I979, p. Sff) call this model, 
which contains the material balance principle, the fundamental model 
because it is the starting point of their estimation theory. 
Shipley now constructs the maximum likelihood ratio test the critical region 
of which is given by 
Z: > k 
where g is the covariance matrix of the random vector Z. This test leads to a 
test statistics which is quadratic in ~· For the case n=2 and independent 
variables Z., i=I, ... ,S, he shows numerically that it is better to neglect the 
-1 
inventory II and to base the test on the global balance I
0
+TI+T2-II; in a 
private discussion he supposed that it will be also true for n>2 and for dependent 
Z., i=I, ... ,2n+I. 
1 
Translating Shipley's approach into ours, the critical region of the maximum 
likelihood ratio test would be defined by 
I 
max exp (- 2 • (~-~)' M:e' ·M=M 
------------------~-------------------- > k I -I 
exp(- 2 · x' • g · ~) 
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which is equivalent to 
{!_: max (~I • f 1 • M - 2 . MI • f 1 • !,) > k I } 
M:e 1 ·M=M 
which, using again the Lagrange formalism, is equivalent to 
2 (M-~~. !,) 
-1 { x:x 1 ·~ ·x + 
e 1 •L>e 
< k"} . 
=-
Thus, one is led to a test statistics which is quadratic in!_ and whose distri-
bution function can therefore hardly be written down explicitly in the general 
case. This means that the probability of detection can be determined only for 
special cases. As, in addition, the maximum likelihood ratio test is not 
the best test in general, it does not seem reasonable to further investigate 
this approach; the Neyman-Pearson test as the most powerful tool has to be 
preferred in any case, 
Ab~upt dive~sion 
In this case the density functions f (Z) of the random vector z under H is the 
0- 0 
same as before. The density function of z under H1 is determined as follows: 
Under the condition, that during the i-th inventory period the amount M is diver-
ted, the distribution function F~ 1 ) (Z), i = 1, .• N, is given by the expression 
~ -
F(i) (Z) == 
1 -
1 
JZ1 JZN ( 1 ( (. )' ) 1 ( (, ) )) • • • • d~ • exp - 2 • ~ - H. ~ • f • ~ -H. ~ n 1 
(2n)2 • 1~12 
i = 1 ••• N , 
where ~(i)is a row vector which has only zero 1 s except for the i-th component 
the value of which is M. 
The unconditioned distribution function F1 (~) is given by 
N 
F ( z) = I: F ( i) ( z) • q~ 
1- . 1 1 - ... ~== 
N 
with r qi == 1 , 
i=1 
therefore, the density function under H1 is given by 
1 N 
n 1 • r 
(2n)2 • I~ 12 i=1 
exp ( 1 ( (i))
1 
-1 ( (i))) 
--• Z-Jl •I: • Z-Jl •q., 
2 - - = - ~ 
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The critical region of the Neyroan-Pearson test for the two hypotheses 
is according to Theorem 3 given by 
Fo l.'llustratl.'ve purposes we cons1.'der the case N = 2. With r 
= 
z' • 
( 1) 
. ~ 
= 
the critical region is given by 
cr :"•] [ : l " 
crr 2 [_ :~:.l " 1 ~p• • ( 
The problern is that even in this special case the distribution of the test sta-
tistic cannot be written down explicitely, therefore, the optimal alternative 
hypothesis q* cannot be determined analytically. With the help of simulation stu-
dies (Horsch 1982) it has been shown, that the supposition 
~* ::: 
~·e 
---::--=--- = 
e 1 • ~ • e l ' 
which seems tobe intuitive because of the results of the next section,aannot 
be confirmed; in general q* depends on the false alarm probability a. 
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1.2 A Special Test Studied by Jaech et al. 
The idea of the test procedure to be discussed now is to establish a linear 
combination 
n 
s ::::: r a. . Z, = a' . z n i=1 l. l. 
with help of the n different MUF variables and to use this linear combination 
as the test statistic at the end of the reference time [t ,t ]. The acceptance 
o n 
region of this test is therefore simply given by 
Even though this test does not provide any information about the time of diver-
sion at all, and therefore, in case of protracted diversion it would be better 
to use the test statistic r Z, - a special case of the statistic to be discussed 
i l. 
here - we will analyze this test statistic as it has played a role in the litera-
ture and since abrupt diversion can be analyzed here. 
Protraated Diversion 
It is clear that Theorem 3 covers this test procedure, too, nevertheless, we 
present the main result separately as 
Theorem 6 (Frick 1979 a,b) 
Given the random vector ~, defined in the introduction, with known regular co-
variance matrix ~· Let 6 be a test for the two hypotheses H
0 
and H1 , 
H E(Z) = 0 
0 
H1 E (Z) = H_ : ~· • H_ = M > 0 
with a fixed significance level and power 1 - ß6 (Jl) , defined by 
for ~· • !r 
other.wi.se, 
where ~· = (a 1 ••• aN) is an arbitrary real vector. Then the power 1- ß6** of the 
test 6**, defined by 
6** = { 1 
0 
f or c • ~· • !• c > 0 
otherwise, 
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fulfills the relations 
max min(l-ß 0 (~)). {8} {~} 
The minimizing alternative hypothesis is 
M 
e 
e e 
= 
Proof 
As the linear form~··~ of multivariate normally distributed random variables 
is normally distributed with expectation values 
E(~' ·Z) 0 under H0 and E(~' ·Z) ~· ·_!: under H1 
and with the variance 
var(~'·Z) = ~··~·~, 
the power of the test is 
~·.!: 
= $ ( - ul ) . 
Ia' ·~ · a -a 
Because of the monotony of ~ we only have to prove 
~:~I'.!:!.* ~··.!:!. ~··.!:!. 
= min max max min 
I a ~~' · ~ · a··~ H. a Ia' •g ·a a H. Ia' ·g ·a 
=-
We perform this by showing that the saddZe point criterion 
~*· '.!:!. ~1t' '.!:!.* a' ·u* 
> :> 
Ia*' ·~·a* la1~' ·~·a1·~- Ia• .~·a 
-4- =- =- =-
is fulfilled. Now, these two inequalities are equivalent to 
M 
--;::::::;:=== > /e' ·~ ·e 
=-
M 
> 
le' ·~ ·e 
=-
M a' ·~ ·e =-
/e' ·~ ·e Ia' ·~ · a 
=- =-
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which means that it suffices to show 
2 (e' ·~>e)·(a' ·L:·a)>(a' ·L:·e) 
- =- - =--- =-
As the symmetric and regular matrix g can be represented as the product of 
a regular matrix ~ and its transposed matrix ~·, 
this inequality is equivalent to 
where a and e are defined as 
this, however, is nothing else than the Sahwartz' inequaLity which completes 
the proof. 
Jaech (1977) has determined the best weighting coefficients under the 
assumption 
M. ]. 
M for i=l, ... ,n, 
n 
D 
and, furthermore, by postulating that S shall represent an unbiased estimate 
n 
of the total diversion M. Because of 
M 
= L:a. ·-i l. n 
!:!·e'·a 
n-
the probability of detection is given by 
1-ß J 
M 
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and the problern is to minimize the quadratic form 
under the boundary condition 
a' • ~ • a 
= 
e' · a n , 
which leads, using again the Lagrange formalism, to the optimal weighting 
coefficients 
a* 
n -I ~ •e 
. -1 
e 
1 
• ~ •e 
and consequently, to the optimal acceptance region 
J -1 I -1 z~t ={ z:e'.~ •z < le'·~ •e•U } 
o - - = - - - = - 1-a 
and to the optimal probability of detection 
which, by the way, is the same as that of the Neyman-Pearson test under 
M H : M =- • e. I - n 
As already pointed out by Stewart and Wincek (1980), this procedure aims at 
the optimal detection of constant lasses, its value for the detection of 
pu~poseful dive~sion of material has to be doubted. It is also in this line of 
detecting constant losses that the postulate of the unbiasedness of Sn has been 
formulated: Whereas an operator is interested to estimate his losses, an 
inspector must primarily be interested in the detection of diversion; there-
fore, from his point of view the unbiasedness of S has no meaning at all. 
n 
Ab~pt Dive~sion 
Contrary to the situation in the foregoing section, here we can solve the problern 
completely: 
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Theorem 7 
Given the random vector ~~ defined in the introduction 1 with known regular co-
variance matrix E. Let 6 be a test for the two hypotheses H
0 
and H11 
H 
0 
E (Z) == 0 
{ M with prob q., i == 1, .. n, H1 E(Z.) == 
]_ 
]_ 
0 otherwise, 
with fixed significance level and power 1 - ß6 (p) 1 defined by 
I for ~ • ~' 
otherwise 1 
where ~~ == (a1 ••• an) is an arbitrary real vector. Then the power 1 - ßo** of the 
test 6** 1 defined by 
6** == { 1 
0 
for c • e 1 • X 1 c > 0 
otherwise, 
fulfills the relations 
1 - ß6** == min max (1 - ß6 (~) == max min ( 1 - ß6 (~ ). {q .} { a} { a} { 6 } 
]_ - -
The minimizing alternative hypothesis is given by 
e' • E 
q* = el • E • e 
Proof 
The probability of no detection ß6= ß(~1 ~) is given by 
L<I! 
i ( 
a • M) i 
u1 cx- •q. 
- Va • E • a ]_ 
- = -
therefore, we have to show 
The left hand inequality is trivial. In order to prove the right hand inequality, 
we determine the minimum of ß(~,~*) with respect to a. We get 
3 
3a,, 
J 
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t <I> (u - a i . M ) • q . * = 
i 1-<X ~ ~ 
- = -
( 
a. •M ) ( 1 ) 
q}' U --~--- (a. •M) ·-3- ·q~* + 
1-cx '€ , t . a ~ 3aj '€-· ""'L:_•_a_ _,_ 
+ <I>' ( 
a.•M )( M 
u - J ---~- + a • M • _3_ ( 
1-cx ~ Va~ • L: • a i 3ai Va' 
- :::: - -
1 )) • q, * = 
~·a J 
Putting these first derivatives at a = a* equal to zero, we get with 
3 1 a' 
. L: 
äa = v~· a) 3/2 - . L: . a (a' . L: . 
the following determinants for ~* 
- e' • L: + q* • (e' • L: • e) = 0 
- = - - = -
which completes the proof. ):( 
One very interesting observation can be made here: The expeated amount of material 
to be diverted in the i-th inventory period, is 
M•q,* + 0• (1-q.*) = M•q.*. 
~ ~ ~ 
This means, that the vector of expected diversions in the n inventory periods is 
M 
M • _q* = --:---=--
e' • ~ • e • e' • L: 
which is exaatly the same as that of the real diversions in the protracted diver-
sion case. 
Let us repeat what has already been said at the end of section 1.1, p. 28: 
The results for Jaech's test lead to the supposition that also for the Neyman-
Pearson test the optimal abrupt diversion strategy is given by Theorem 7; this, 
however, cannot be confirmed. 
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1.3 The n-fold Test Procedure by Avenhaus and Frick 
As two successive MUF variables Z. and Z. 1, i=l, ... ,n-1, arenot independent 1 1+ 
because of the common inventory I., the test procedure tobe outlined now does 
1 
not use the Z., i=l, •.. ,n, directly, but uses instead linear combinations of 
1 
them which are independent. 
Stewart (1958) developed these linear combinations by estimating the start-
ing inventory si-1 for the i-th inventory period with the help of a linear 
combination of the foregoing- appropriately defined- book and ending physical 
inventories, 
S. I:= a. I 1- 1-
'V 
B. I+ (1-a. 1) ·I. I' i=2, ... ,n 1- 1- 1-
S I 
0 0 
in such a way that this estimate is an unbiased estimate of the starting 
inventory under the null hypothesis and has a minimum variance. The resulting 
modified MUF variables~., 
1 
'V 
a. I • (B. I - I. I ) + T . I + T . - I. = 1- 1- 1- 1- 1 1 
i=2, ... ,n, 
~I 
where ai-l is given by 
var(Ii-l) 
, i=2, •.. ,n 
a 0, 
0 
in fact represent linear combinations of the z. which are uncorrelated, 
1 
cov(~., ~.) 
1 J 0 for i#j, 
and they are independent because we assumed normal distribution for z .. 
1 
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Thus, the covariance rnatrix of the randorn variables ~. is a diagonal rnatrix, 
2 ~ 
the i-th diagonal elernent of which we call cr., and the probability density 
'V ~ 
function of the randorn vector ~' = (z 1, ••• ,~) is the product of the density - n 
functions of the randorn variables~., i=t, ... ,n. 
~ 
Protracted Diversion 
Under the null hypothesis H that no material is diverted at all, we have 
0 
H: E (~.) = E (Z.) = O, i=l, ... ,n. 
0 0 ~ 0 ~ 
Under the alternative hypothesis H1 that in the i-th inventory period the 
arnount M., i=t, •.. ,n, is diverted, we have 
~ 
and therefore, 
Hl: EI (~i) 
E 1 (~ 1) 
M. for i=t, •.. ,n, 
~ 
a. 1 ·E(~. 1)+M., i=2, ... ,n, ~- ~- ~ 
Avenhaus and Frick (1974a) analyzed the 
hypotheses H
0 
and H1: For each of the n ~., i=t, ... ,n, a significance threshold 
~ 
following procedure for testing the 
observations ~. of the randorn variables 
~ 
is defined in such a way that the s. 
~ 
overall false alarrn probability a does not exceed a given value. This rneans 
that the inspector decides 
H is accepted if ~. <s. for all i=t, •.. ,n 
0 ~- ~ 
Hl is accepted if ~. >s. for at least one ~ ~ 
i.e. the acceptance region is given by 
ZAF:= ä. < s., i=l, ... ,n}, 
0 ~ ~ 
where the s.-values are subject to the boundary condition 
~ 
or, because of the independence of the ~., 
~ 
i out of 1, ••• , n, 
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n 
1-a rr prob{~. < s. IH } 
i=I 1 - 1 o 
which, with the help of the single false alarm probability given by 
also can be written as 
1-a. prob{~.< s.IH }, i=I, ... ,n, 
1 1- 1 0 
n 
1-a = rr ( 1-a . ) . 
i=I 1 
The overall probability of detection defined by 
1-ß =I-prob{~ < s A .•. A ~ < s IH 1} AF 1-1 n-n 
'V 
likewise because of the independence of the z. and with the single probabil~ 
1 
ities of detection 
can be written as 
1-ß. prob{~.> s.IH1}, i=I, ... ,n, 1 1 1 
1-ß AF 
n 
1- rr ß. 
i=I 1 
Explicitly, the relation between the significance thresholds s. and the single 
1 
false alarm probabilities a. is given by 
1 
s. 
1-a. = il> (-2:.), i=l, ... ,n . 
1 CJ.. 
1 
Therefore, the single probabilities of detection 1-ß., given by 
1 
C
a. I ·EI (~. I) +M. -s.) 1- 1- 1 1 • 1-ß. = <I> , 1=l, ... ,n, 
1 C1. 
1 
being functions of the single false alarm probabilities a. are given by 
1 
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'V 
1-ß. 
~ 
a. 1·E 1 (Z. I )+M. ~(--~---------~-------~ 
a. 
L 
Ul-a.), i=I, ... ,n, 
~ 
and the total probability of detection 1-ßAF is given by 
I -
n 
TI ~ (U 1-a. -
'V 
a. 1·E 1(z. 1)+M. ~- ~- ~ 
(J. ) 
i=I ~ ~ 
As the strategies Xa and YM of the inspector and of the operator are given by 
Xa:= {a': (a 1' ... 'an): O<a. <I, TI (J-a. ) = 1-a} 
- ~- . ~ 
~ 
yM:= {M': (MI' ••• ,M~): O<M., ;:;M. = M} -~ . ~ ' ~ 
the optimal significance thresholds si (or equivalently, the optimal false alarm 
probabilities ai) are determined by the following optimization problem: 
maximize 
aEX 
a 
The solution of this problern is 
Theorem 8 (Avenhaus and Frick 1974 a) 
'V 
Given the random vector ~' defined above, with known diagonal covariance matrix ~· 
Let 6 be a test for the two hypotheses H
0 
and H1 , 
H 
0 
'V 
E(Z)= 0 
'V 'V 
H1 E (Z,) == ai-1 • E(Z, 1) + ll. i == 2 ... n , -l l- l 
'V 
E(Z1) = l-11 , 
e' ·~ M > o, 
-
with fixed significance level and power 1 - ß6 (!!), defined by 
'V 
for z. ~ a. • u1 , i = 1 .•• n , 1 1 -cx. 
l 
otherwise. 
Then the power 1 - ß6** of the test 6**, defined by 
6** = { ~ 
'V 
for z. ~ a. •U 1 *, i = 1 ... n, ~ 1 -cx. 
l 
otherwise , 
where a * is given by i 
exp (-xi- ~ • u2( exp (xi) )) 
cr. • ( 1-a. ) 
~ ~ 
n 
(j 
n 
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exp (-xi-1 - ~ • u2( exp (xi-1) )) == o I i == 2' ... ~n-1 I 
cr. 1•(1-a, 1) 
~- ~-
exp (-xn-1 - ~ • u2( exp (xn-1))) == o 
cr 1 • (1-a 1) n- n-
r X , ::: ln (1-a) 
j==1 J 
x . == ln (1-a . ) 
J J 
fulfills the relations 
1 - ßö** == min max (1 - ß0 (ll)) {lJ} {6} 
== max min (1 - ß0 (ll)) • {o} {lJ} 
The minimizing alternative hypothesis is given by 
n-1 
ll +I: (1-a.) •lJ. == M, 
n j==1 J J 
where Q(x) is defined by 
Q (x) d :== - ln <'>(x) • dx 
i==1 1 ... 1n 1 
For illustrative and later purpose 1 we give the solution for n == 2: 
are solutions of the following system of equations 
( 1 - a ) • cr • (1 - a) • exp (.!. · u2 ) - ( 1 - a ) • cr • exp (.!. · u2 ) == o 1 1 2 1-a1 2 2 2 1-a;a 
and furthermore, 
1-a 
+ 
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0 
We see that the optimal values of a 1 and a 2 do not depend on the value of M. 
(This is also true for n>2). They only depend on the single parameter 
er I 
(1--a) cr which means that they lend themselves to a convenient graphical 
represent~tion. This is shown in Fig. Ia: the optimal values of a 1 and a 2 for 
er I 
given values of (a-1)•-- and a are the intersections of the two curves with the (Tz 
appropriate values. In FLg. lb the more interesting area (0 < a ~ 0, I) LS 
shown on a larger scale. 
According to the definitions of cr 1 ,cr2 and a, we have 
2 (var(D1) +var(I1)) 2 (1- a) 
If we assume stable plant conditions, 
var (I
0
) = var (I1) = var (I2), var (D1) = var (D 2), 
then we get 
2 (1- a) cr1 2 
• cr22 = 
var (I) + var (D) 
3 • var (I) + var (D) 
and we can show immediately 
. ~ s; ( 1 - a) • ~ s; 1 • 
VJ CJ2 
The Figure shows us that in this latter case the optimal value of a
2 
is always 
larger than that of a1 • 
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0,9 
0,75 
0,5 
0,25 
0,75 
0,5 
0,1 
0.25 
oL_~~~----~~----------~-------------l ______ _L ______ a1 
0,1 0,25 0,5 0,75 0,9 1,0 
Figure 1a: Graphical representation of the equation 
1 2 1 2 (1-a )·o ·(1-a)·exp(-•U )-(1-a )•o ·exp(-·U ) = 0 1 1 2 1-a 1 2 2 2 1-a 2 
01 
for various values of (1-o)·-- and of the equation 
02 
(1-a 1H1-a 2) = 1-a 
for various values of a (after Heidl and Schmidt (1980)). 
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0,1 
0,05 
a = 0.1 
0,05 
0,01 
0~--~--------------------~--------------------------~---a, 0,01 0,0 5 0,1 
Figure 1b: Graphical representation of the same equation as re-
presented in Fig. 1a, larger scale (after Heidl and 
Schmidt (1980)). 
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At least for ai = 0 - i.e. for the case where 
measured precisely and therefore are taken as 
next inventory period - one can show that the 
the physical inventories 
the starting. inventories 
2 
smaller the variances 0· 1 
the smaller are the corresponding optimal significance thresholds 
s'!' = o. 
1 1 
u 1-a~ 
1 
are 
for 
of 
and the smaller are the amounts of material M~ to be diverted in the i~th 
1 
the 
'V 
zi are, 
inventory period. This can be interpreted in such a way that in inventory periods 
during which the technical possibility (expressed by the variance of the measure-
ment errors) of detecting diversion is good, the operator will divert only small 
amounts of material, if any, and the inspection teamwill check the material 
balance only in a rather loose way. 
AbPUpt Diversion 
As in this case simple and intuitive solutions cannot be obtained, we will li-
mit our discussion to the case n = 2. 
Under the null hypothesis H , that no material is diverted at all, we have 
0 
again 
Under the alternative hypothesis a1 that in the i-th inventory period the amount 
M is diverted wi th probabili ty qi, i = 1, 2, where q1 + q2 = 1, we have 
E (Z.) 
1 
with probability q,, i = 1,2 
1 
otherwise. 
Under the condition that the amount M is diverted in the first inventory period, 
the overall probability of no detection is 
(we assume c:x2 to be determinated by ( 1 - c:x1 ) • (1 - c:x2 ) = 1 -<X) • Under the condi tion 
that the amount M is diverted in the secend inventory period, the overall proba-
bility of no detection is 
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The unconditioned probability of no detection therefore is 
ß(<X1 ,q), 
here we have defined 
q1 ==: q , q2 ==: 1 - q • 
The optimal single false alarm probabilities cx1* and cx2* and the optimal diver-
sion strategy q*, i.e., those strategies which fulfill the saddlepoint criterion 
are given by the conditions 
which leads to the following determinants for cx 1* and q*: 
Contrary to the situation in section 1.2, where we were 1able to establish an 
equivalence between the true optimal diversion fractions in the single inven-
tory periods for the protracted diversion case on one hand, and the expected 
optimal diversion fractions for the abrupt diversion case on the other, we see 
here no relation at all. Furthermore, the optimal inspection strategy (cx 1*,cx2*> 
is not independent of the total diversion M. 
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Deteation Time 
The surprising result which we have derived in the two foregoing sections, name-
ly that it is optimal in the sense of the overall probability of detection not 
to use the in-between inventories, highlights the question for the optimum num-
ber of inventory periods for one material balance area in a given reference time 
(O,T). In order to tackle this problern we have to formulate the appropriate op-
timization criterion. We will proceed in two steps. 
First, let us assume that the criterion is again the overall probability of de-
tection. In the sense of this criterion it is best, as we have seen in the fore-
going sections, to have only one beginning and one ending inventory, i.e., to 
establish only one balance for the whole reference time. 
One additional point has to be mentioned in this connection: If one considers 
n inventory periods in the reference time (O,T), and if one uses Stewart's star-
ting inventory estimate for all inventory periods and determines the guaranteed 
overall probability of detection according to Theorem 81 then one can prove di-
rectly that only one inventory period is better than more periods in case of 
protracted diversion- which is not surprising according to Theorem 4. What 
one cannot prove isthat n2 periods are worse than n1 periods for n2 > n1 ; 
however, numerical calculations indicate this. An example taken from Avenhaus 
and Frick (1974 b) is given in Figure 2a. This is important for the following 
reason: 
Let us consider as second criterion the deteation time, From what was been 
said up to now, one could make two assumptions about the detection time. First, 
one would assume that the shorter an inventory period is, the shorter the de-
tection time is. Second, according to the result stated above, with an increa-
sing number of inventory periods per reference time, the probability of detec-
tion decreases. Therefore, detection may depend on the values of the parameters 
of the stronger of the two effects. From these considerations one concludes 
that the expected detection time T is the appropriate optimization criterion 
from the detection point of view, because it takes into account both aspects, 
the actual time at which detection may occur and the probability for detec-
tion at that time. 
Before entering into this subject, we repeat once more what has already been 
said at the end of the introduction to this part: Even if the observation of 
a specific MUF variable exceeds its significance threshold, the final decision 
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is made only at the end of the reference time. Thus 1 one may speak here of a ' 
detection time in retrospect in the sense that at the end of the reference 
time a statement is made when the loss or diversion was observed the first time. 
Let us work for the following with the MUF statistics 1 which are independent1 
as we saw. The expected detection time E(T) 1 which shall be measured in units 
of inventory periods 1 is the sum of the products of detection times 1 i 1 i= 1 ..• n 1 
and probabilities for first detection at time i. 
In order to formalize these ideas 1 we introduce the concept of the run Zength RL. 
The run length is defined as the time from the beginning until the first "detec-
tion" (which may be a false alarm) : 
{RL== i} == {first detection at ti} • 
It should be noted that in the monograph of van Dobben (1968) the run length 
is defined as the time until the rejection of the null hypothesis H • Herel 
0 
we will use it in the general sense. 
The probabilities of these events are in our case given by the following 
expressions: 
i) In case the null hypothesis H is true 
0 
i-1 
<X, ·n (1 - ()(.) 
prob {RL == i} 
~ j==1 J 
::: 
0:1 for i ::: 1 
for i ::: 2 ••• n 
ii) In case the alternative hypothesis H1 is true 
where ß, is given by 
~ 
( 1 - ß.) 
~ 
1 - ß 1 
i-1 
·n 
j==1 
ß, for i == 2 ••• n 
J 
for i == 1 1 
( 
a. 1 • E1 (z~ _1) + M~ ) = (L) u - _~_-__ ..:;____ ....___ :;:::_ .... 
1-o:i oi I i == 1 ..• n • 
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One is now faced with the difficulty of taking into account the probability 
that no detection at all accurs during the reference time, the probability 
of this event is given by 
If we call a the detection time for the case in which detection occurs only 
after the end of the reference time, then the expected detection time is gi-
ven by 
i-1 n 
0-ß.) • n ß.+a· n 
1 j~1 J i~1 ß .• 1 
i • 
The difficulty with this formula is that there exists no natural numerical 
value for a. 
A more satisfying optimization criterion is the expected detection time T 1 
under the condition that detection will take place during the reference 
time. This criterion again takes into account both aspects of detection 
time - actual time and probability of detection at that time. It is given 
by 
n i-1 
1- ß + !: i • (1 - ßi) n ßj 1 . 2 j~1 
E (Tl) 1~ ~ 
n 
1 - n ßi 
i~1 
This relation can be understood as follows: By definition, we have 
E (Tl) ~ !: i • prob {RL ~ i I detection in 
i 
!: 
(O,T)}~i 
i • prob {RL ~ i A detection in (O,T)} 
prob {detection in (O,T)} 
Now, the event 'detection in (O,T)' may be described as the union of the events 
{ RL ~ i} f or i ~ 1 ... n: 
{detection in (O,T)} ~ ~ {RL ~ i} 
therefore we have 
prob { RL = i A detection in (0 ,T)} ~ prob { RL = i} . 
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Furthermore, because of the independence of the events {RL= i} - first detection 
at t. means that at t. ,j < i, no detection took place - and because of the inde-
1 "' J 
pendence of the MUF,, we have 
1 
prob {detection in (O,T)} 
n i-1 
n 
:! 
i=1 
= 1 - ß + r ( 1 - ß. > • n ßJ. = 1 i=2 1 j=1 
n 
1- n ßi 
i=1 
the latter relation is intuitive, but can also easily be proven by complete in-
duction. Inserting these relations into the definitions completes the deriva-
tion. 
Numerical calculations show that this conditioned expected detection is not 
a monotonically decreasing function of the number of inventories. A numeri-
cal illustration is given in Figure 2b. 
The fact that we have difficulties with the appropriate definition of the 
expected detection time is a consequence of the fact that we consider a 
fixed referenae time intervaZ (O,T). This we do in order to be able to con-
trol the overall false alarm probability o. An alternative way, which leads 
to a more natural definition of the expected detection time and still allows 
to control the number of false alarms, goes as follows, if we work again with 
the MUF statistics. 
If we consider an infinite time intervaZ (O,oo) and, accordingly, an infinite 
number of inventory periods, we get 
.'I: prob {RL = i} = 1 
1=1 
thus, detection is a certain event, and we can define the expected run length 
under the alternative hypothesis 
00 
E (RL) = :L 
i=1 
00 
i • prob { RL = i} = 1 - ß + :L 
1 . 2 1= 
i . 
i-1 
( 1- ß,) • n ßJ. under H1 • 1 . 1 J= 
Now, if we take for the moment for each inventory period the same value of 0 
for the false alarm probability, then we get under the null hypothesis H the 
0 
expected run length 
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a. = 0,1 M = 28 kg 
0,9 = 0,05 M = 32 kg 
1- ß = 0,01 M = 40kg 
0,8 
t 
- NUMBER OF INVENTORIES 
Figure 2a:Probability of detection as a function of the nurober 
of inventories per year with a and M as parameter. 
1,0 
\ 
' 
\ 
- "'· ~--,_ -:::::;r.-= 1--·-~--·--- :.~--::: >. ·-· --.:..:--· ~ 
0,8 
0,6 
N L I I 1-1-
'I I 
t oL :0,01 d:.:O,OS ~=0,1 M = 40kg M = 32 kg M = 28kQ 
'-- -n 
0,4 
0,2 
I 
2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Figure 2b:Expected conditional detection time as a function of the 
nurober of inventories per year with a and M as parameters. 
00 
E (RL) :::<X+ L: 
i=2 
i-1 
i . cx. n 
j=1 
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00 
( 1 - cx> = cx + n 
i=2 
i • (X • ( 1 - <X) i -1 ::: 
:::(X. (1 + .!.__ 1 + 1- (X ) = 1 
cx cx2 cx under H 0 
(i-1=j) 
This gives us the following idea: Instead of postulating a value for the over-
all false alarm probability for a fixed interval of time, we postulate a value 
for the expected run length under the null hypothesis H . 
0 
To take the detection time as an optimization criterion then would mean to mi-
nimize the expected run length unde~ an appropriately defined alternative hy-
pothesis H1, subject to a fixed expected run length under the null hypothesis 
H . It is clear that such a program can only be tackled with the help of si-
o 
mulation studies. 
There is one objection against this procedure from a political point of view: 
From the standpoint of the non-weapons NPT signatory states it is important 
that at regular fixed points of time (e.g., at the end of the year) the safe-
guards authority makes a statement that from the nuclear fuel cycle of that 
state no material has beendiverted, if no significant differences occured. It 
is questionable if a procedure, where in principle all foregoing MUF's are ta-
ken into account for making a statement on a specific MUF at a given time, is 
compatible with such a postulate from the side of the non-weapons states. This 
postulate in fact, was the basic reason for working with a finite reference 
time. 
Let us conclude this section with the observation that so far nobody has made 
an attempt to balance the two criteria "overall probability of detection" and 
"expected detection time" - one exception being the general sequential game 
theoretical approach to be discussed in the second part of this paper which, 
however, does not directly answer this question. From a methodological point 
of view, this is a difficult multiobjective decision theoretical problem. From 
a safeguards point of view, the question is far from being settled. There is 
only one recent official statement (Shea et al. 1981) which says 
"In this regard, in IAEA safeguards, the timeliness objective is never gi-
ven equal importance in comparison to detection sensitivity." 
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Even though it is not explicitely stated 1 that detection sensitivity has to be 
understood as probability of detection 1 nor have the boundary conditions (e.g. 1 
false alarm probability) formulated quantitatively, one sees that different 
weights are given to different objective functions. 
1.4 CUMUF Tests 
The results of the foregoing sections showed that from the overall probabi-
lity of detection point of view it is optimal to consider only the material 
balance over the total reference time. Nevertheless 1 there are reasons to 
consider the in-between inventories in order to localize any lass or diver-
sion in time. The oombination of these two aspects leads us to the conjec-
ture that the so-called CUMUF- test, based on the sums of MUF-variables 1 
j 
Y. := CUMUF. := :L z. 
J J i=1 ~ 
might be a useful test for our purposes. 
This test represents a special application of the so-called CUSUM- test (see, 
e.g. 1 van Dobben de Bruyn (1968)) to the nuclear material safeguards case and 
hasl e.g. 1 been studied by Stewart et al. (1979). The idea- same as in the 
foregoing section - is to test the hypotheses 
H E (Y.) = 0 
0 J 
E (Y.) = 
J 
j j n 
:L E(Z.) = :L M. I :L M. =M 
i=1 ~ i=1 ~ i=1 ~ 
for protracted diversion 
j 
M with probability :L 
i=1 
q. and zero otherwise 
J 
for abrupt diversion 
separately in such a way that the overall false alarm probability a does not 
exceed a given value. The acceptance region of this test has the form 
Z 
0 
CM : = { ~ i 5 s i 1 i = 1 •.• n } 1 
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where the s. values are subject to the boundary condition of a fixed overall 
~ 
probability of detection, 
1 - a = prob { ~ 1 :$ s 1 A ••• A ~ n :$ s n I H 0 } • 
A 
Contrary to the situation in the foregoing section the random variables Y, are 
J 
not independent, therefore, it is impossible in general to give an explicit 
expression for the overall probability of detection 1 - ßCM defined by 
Consequently, it is impossible as a rule to give explicit expressions for the 
optimal significance thresholds. For the purpese of illistration, we consider 
the special case n = 2. 
Protracted Diversion 
In this case we have 
and therefore, 
Ho: K"(Y I) 
H1 : E (Y I) 
The second moments are given by 
var (Y 1) var(I ) 0 
var(Y2) var(I ) 0 
E(Y2 ) = 0 
MI, E(Y2 ) M. 
+ var(T 1) + var(T2) 
+ var(T 1) + var(T2) 
2 
=: crl 
+ var(I2) =: 
2 
cr2 
cov(Y 1, Y2) cov(I0 +T 1, Io+TI) var(I0 )+var(T 1) =·p·cr ·cr >0 ' I 2 ' 
The single false alarm probabilities ai' defined by 
1-a. = prob{Y. < s. IH }, ~ ~ - ~ 0 
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aue explicitly given by 
They are related to the overall false alarm probability a by the following 
equation 
As the common probability density of the random variables Y1 and Y2 under H0 
is given by 
• expf- ~ · ~ 
\ 1-p 
t2 
(-1 -
2 
crl 
the relation between a, a 1 and a 2 is explicitly given by 
1-a -
- 2'1T 
I 
Q 
u 1-a I 
f 
-oo 
This relation has been studied extensively by Avenhaus (1979); a graphical 
representation of this relation for a = 0.05 has been given in Fig. 3. 
As the common probability density of the random variables Y1 and Y2 under H1 
is given by 
2p (t 1-M 1) (t2-M) 
crlcr2 
the probability of detection as a function of the single false alarm probabil-
i ties defined by 
p 
1-ßcM 
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0,040 f a 2 
0,030 
0,020 
0,010 
0 +-----4-----~----~-----+-----4----~----~------~----~--~ 
0 0,010 0,020 0,030 
Figure 3: Graphical representation of the relation 
1-a. = 
u 1-a. 
1 ( 1 
27f·~·.J 
-oo 
-oo 
0,040 0,050 
between a. 1 and a. 2 for a.=0.05 and p as parameter; after Avenhaus (1979). 
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is given explicitly by the following expression: 
MI 
U I-al - a 1 
M 
f dt 1 p 1-ßCM = 1-
-oo -oo 
To determine the optimal strategy (a1*,a2*) which fulfills the total fals alarm boundary condition, and which counteracts any strategy of the operator, we first 
have to determine 
M u --1-a 2 2 (J 
f dt2 
-oo 
1 
exp(- 2 
1 
--2 · ((Ul-a 
1-p 1 
1 ( - -) 
(J ' 1 
which is smaller than zero. This means that ß is monotonely decreasing with 
increasing M1 meaning that for any values of a 1 and a 2 , ß has its maximum 
with respect to M1 for M1 = 0. Therefore, we get by use of the derivation of a 
function of the type 
g (x) 
F(x) f dt·f(t,x) 
-oo 
the well-known formula 
d 
dx F(x) d f ( g(x), x) · dx g(x) + 
d the following expression for -- ß: da 1 
u M 1-a 02 2 
g (x) 
f dt 
-oo 
d dx f(t,x) 
1 1 
_1_. (U2 2TI • --- f dt2 exp(-- . - 2p •U • t Q~ 2 2 1-a 1-a 2 -oo 
+ _1_. _!_ 
2 'lf ;---;:; 
/I-p2 
1 
exp (- -2 
1-p 1 1 
+ t2)· 
2 
~u da 1 1-a1 + 
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Since 
d d 1 2 
- U ==- -- U ==- I/2TI • exp (-2 • U ) < 0 , d()(1 1-()(1 d('\ ()(1 ()(1 
and because we get by implicit differentiation of the relation between a, a 1 
and a2 
0 4>(-1-
Q 
which leads to 
we finally get 
u 
I (U 1_,.. - p•U 1_,.. )) + q> (-- • (U - p·U 1_,.. )) 
"'2 "'I I? I-al "'2 
d 
--u da 1 a2 
1-a 2 
/)-p~ 
(**) 
~ß I 
da 1 == 2rr' /2 f 
I I 2 I 2 d 
exp(- -·--· (t -p·U ) )•exp(- -·U )- U + 
2 l-p 2 2 1-a 1 2 1-a 1 da 1 1-a 1 /1-p~ 
ul-a 
I I I 
+ 2rr' 12 _L dtl 
/1-p ... 
-oo 
q> (-1-· (U -p •U ) ) ~ 1-a2 1-a1 
+ q> (-1-· (U -p • (U - ~))) • exp (~• (U - ~)) ·---=1~P ______ _ 
;---;) 1-a 1 1-a2 cr 2 2 l-a2 cr 2 q> (-1_, (U -p. U ) ) /J-p""' I? l-a 1 1-a2 /)-p""' 
Whereas it does not seem possible to show for all parameter values of M, a, cr 2 , 
p that 
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i.e., aj=O, i.e. s 1=oo, it proved tobe like that for all special cases which 
were considered and, furthermore, it is intuitive: If in the first inventory 
period no material is diverted, the inspector does not need to check the first 
balance at all but has to concentrate his false alarm possibility on the second 
period, which me~ns that only the global balance test is performed. 
The fact that ßcM has its maximum for M2 = 0, yields an interesting interpret-
ation which throws some light on the meaning of the CUMUF test: One can inter-
pret the first step of this test as an attempt to estimate the diversion M1 in 
the first period in order to specify the diversion M-M1 in the second period (M 
given); in fact, for appropriately chosen M1 and a 1 and a2 (a given), one has 
M 
<P(a
2
- ul-a). 
Therefore, the best counterstrategy of the operator obviously is to choose 
M1 = 0 in order not to permit such an estimate. This means again that this test 
procedure may be useful in cases where diversion strategies can be anticipated. 
Abrupt Diversion 
In this case the variables Y1 and Y2 are defined as before and therefore, now 
{ M q E(Y1) = with probability 0 1 - q 
E(Y2 ) = M 
The second moments are again given as before, the same holds for the single 
and the overall false alarm probabilities. 
A The probability of detection 1 - ßCM as a function of the single false alarm 
probabilities is given by 
M 
u --
1-()(2 02 
1 J dt2 exp (- t · 1 ~ P2 • ( \ 2- 2pt1 t 2 + t~ ) ) • q + 
- 00 
J =1----2TT·~ 
- 00 
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1 
exp (- .!_ • - 1- • (t 2- 2pt t + t 2 )) • (1 - q). 2 1 - p2 1 1 2 2 
if we remernher that ~2 is fixed by ~ 1 for given overall false alarm probability. 
The optimal strategies ~ 1 * and q* have to fulfill the saddlepoint criterion 
ßA ( * ) < ß A ( * *) < ßA *) CM ~1 ,q - CM ~1 ,q - CM(~1,q ' 
This criterion is fulfilled if the two relations hold 
1 
2TT• ~ 
u 
1 
= 
2TT• ~ 
d ßA ( * d~ CM ~1 ,q ) 
1 
f 
- (X) 
dt • 1 f 
- CO 
M 
u --1-~1* 1-~/ C12 
J dt1 J dt2 
- (X) - (X) 
exp (- 1 1 ( t 12 - 2 p t 1 t 2 + t 22 ) ) 2. 1- p2 ( 1) 
(2) 
For ~1*= 0 relation (1) is satisfied; this means that again only CUMUF is tested. 
Furthermore, we have 
M 
d A 1 jru1-~2J 02 
- ß = . dt d~ 1 CM 2TT • ~ . 2 
- 00 
exp (- .!.. • -· 1 • ((u - ~)2- 2p (u - ~) • t + t 2 ) • 2 1- p2 1-~1 C11 1-~1 C11 2 2 
M u 1-~1 C11 
+ J dt • exp (-.!.. - 1-· (t 2- 2pt 1 2 1 - p2 1 1 ( ) ( )2) dU ] M M 1-~2 • u -- + u -- • • q + 1-~2 C12 1-~2 C12 d0:1 
- (X) 
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M 
u --1-<X2 cr2 
+ [ J dt2 
- 00 
M 
u --1-<X1 cr 1 
+ J dt1 = 
- 00 
+ exp ] • q + 
M 
(
u - -- p • u ) du 1-a2 cr 2 1-<X 1 • 1-<X 1 + 
~ d<X1 
+ exp 
Because of (*) and <**) we therefore get 
exp (u • ~) • exp 1-a2 cr2 
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From (**) we get 
dt'X2 :=: 0 
dcx1 
for cx1 ::: o , 
furthermore we get with L'Hospital's rule 
= 
lim 
X~ 
lim 
X~ 
exp (x • 0~) • G> (- _P_ • x) ::: l im ~ X~ 
1 ( _l_~. x2) (-~) exp V2TT 2 1-p2 
( M\ exp - x • 0;) 
therefore relation (2) is fulfilled for any q* • 
W ( __ P • x) 
\ V1-p 2 
:=: 0 , 
In section 2.4 we will discuss some numerical results for CUMUF-tests, obtained 
by Pike, Wood and coworkers (1980, 1981). 
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1. 5 Sunnnary of Part I 
Having in mind above all the objective of optimizing the overall probability 
of detecting the diversion of nuclear material during the reference time 
[t ,t ], we have basically stu~ied 
o n 
- the Neyman-Pearson test the statistics of which is simply ~Z., 
• 1. 
1. 
- a special test studied first by Jaech, 
- an n-fold test procedure with fixed the overall false alarm probability, and 
- a CUMUF test. 
Wehaveseen in Section 1.1 that the best test in the sense of the overall 
probability of detection is the test based on the global balance 
~Z. = I + ~T. - I ; this has been supported by the results given in later 
i 1. o i 1. n 
sections, 
To take into account in-between inventories I., i=1, ... ,n-1, makes only sense if 
1. 
one is interested in having information about the time of lass or diversion. As the 
test with the statistics ~a.•Z., described in Section 1.2, does not provide any 
• 1. 1. 
relevant information, it is ruled out. Furthermore, the CUMUF test cannot be 
handled analytically and probably also not numerically for more than two 
inventory periods. In addition, to determine optimal significance thresholds, 
one has to make arbitrary assumptions on the diversion strategy; thus, its use 
cannot be reconnnended either. 
So far only the Neyman-Pearson test and the n-fold test procedure of Section 
1.3 are left. As the only purpose of additional inventories is toshorten the 
detection time, one has to study the appropriately defined, expected detection 
time - this, however, caused major difficulties, as we have seen. At the end of 
Section 1.3 it was illustrated by means of a numerical example that too many 
inventories shorten the conditional, expected detection time; thus, in general, 
there will be an "optimal" number of in-between inventories per reference time. 
It cannot be reconnnended, however, at this stage of the discussion to use this 
"optimal" number of in-between inventories per reference time, as the tradeoff 
between the two objectives "global probability of detection" and "conditional 
expected detection time" has not yet been resolved. 
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PART II 
The Sequential Approach 
In this part it will be assumed that the operator decides at the beginning of 
the reference time whether or not he will divert material, and if yes, which 
amount he will divert in each inventory period. Furthermore, it will be assumed 
that the inspector decides at the beginning of the reference time which test 
procedure he will choose in order to make a decision after each inventory taking 
whether the book physical inventory difference is considered to be significant 
and, therefore, plant operations have to be stopped, or whether it is not 
considered to be significant and, therefore, plant operations can be continued. 
In the second section of this part we look into a model with the additional 
possibility that the inspector is indifferent in his statement. 
The assumption that plant Operations will be stopped in case a significant book 
physical inventory difference occurs, is identical with the supposition that the 
primary safeguards objective of the inspector is to detect a diversion as soon 
as possible and that the inspector considers a single significant book physical 
inventory difference to be so serious that it has to be clarified, if caused by 
an error of the first kind or, if justified, that immediate sanctions have to be 
applied. 
Whereas for the static approach discussed in Part I we were able to formulate 
one general game in such a way that the various test procedures influenced the 
expected payoffs to the inspector and to the operator only via the probability 
of detection, and whereas we were able to show that the two-step procedure 
allowed us to neglect the payoff parameters as lang as we fixed the value of the 
overall false alarm probability, this is no langer the case for the procedures 
to be considered now. The fact that the payoff parameters cannot be eliminated 
completely can be understood intuitively: It must be expressed in some way that 
it is more interesting for the inspector to detect a diversion already at time 
t. and not only at timet. 1, i=l, ••. ,n-1. 1 1+ 
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As in this part either game theoretical models are analyzed which do not lead 
to explicit solutions, or - in section 2.3 - statistical procedures are con-
sidered which emphasize unilaterally the aspect of timely detection, we will 
not discuss the question of the appropriate inventory taking frequency, but 
take its value as fixed a priori. 
In the following, a general frame will be presented for sequentialmodels with 
infinite reference time intervals. One specific model, again based on Stewart's 
estimate for the starting inventory, will be analized in some detail both for 
protracted and abrupt diversion. Finally, the present state of the art of se-
quential approaches for infinite reference time intervals will be discussed. 
First, let us again consider a reference time interval [t ,t ] and let us assume 
o n 
that at most n physical inventories I,, i = 1 ••• n are performed during this 
~ 
reference time at time points t , ••• ,t • Let us assume furthermore that n book 
1 n 
physical inventorv differences z. =I. 1 +T, -I., i=1 ••• n, are formed, and - ~ ~- ~ ~ 
that after each inventory period the inspector performs a tPst in order to de-
cide whether or not during this inventory period or in a foregoing period ma-
terial has been lost or diverted. 
In case of protraated diversion the set of strategies of the operator is 
where p is the probability, that he will divert material, and M, is the amount 
~ 
of material to be diverted in the i-th inventory period. In this case the pair 
of payoffs to the inspector as player 1 and to the operator as player 2 is 
(-a., -b.) in case of diversion and detection after the i-th inventory taking, 
~ ~ 
(-c, d) in case of diversion and no detection, 
(-e., -f.) in case of no diversion and detection after the i-th inventory 
~ ~ 
taking, and 
(0, 0) in case of no diversion and no detection, 
where (a., b., c, d, e., f.) > (0, ... ,0) for i=l, ... ,n, where a. < c, i.e., the 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
inspector's loss in case of a detected diversion is smaller than his loss in case 
of a not detected diversion, and where b. > f., i.e., the operator's loss in case 
~ ~ 
of a detected diversion is greater than his loss in case of a false alarm. 
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Let 1- ß(i) be the probability that in case of diversion the inspector decides 
after the i-th inventory period for the first time that material has been lost 
or diverted. Let furthermore a(i) be the probability that in case of no diver-
sion the inspector decides after the i-th inventory period that material has 
been lost or diverted whereas after the foregoing inventories he had decided 
that nomaterial had been lost or diverted. Then the conditioned expected pay-
offs to the inspector and to the operator are 
d·ßn_ ~ b.· (1-ß(i))) in case of diversion 
i=I ~ 
(- ~ e.·a(i),- ~ f.•a(i)) in case of no diversion1 i=I ~ i= I ~ 
and the unconditioned expected payoffs are 
I:= (-c·ß(n)_ E~·(I-ß(i)))·p+(-~ei·a(i))·(l-p) for the inspector 
i ~ ~ 
B:= (d•ß(n)_~b.· (1-ß(i)))·p+(-~f.·a(i))· (1-p) for the operator. 
i ~ i ~ 
In case of abPupt diVePsion the set of strategies of the operator is 
{ p : p E [ o, 1 ] } ® { ( q 1 ••• qn) : ~ qi = 1 } =: 
~ 
{p} ® 
where q, is the probability that he will divert the amount M in the i-th inven-
~ 
tory period. In this case the pair of payoffs to the inspector and to the Opera-
tor in case of illegal behavior of the operator is much more complicated than 
in the case of protracted diversion, because one has to take into account the 
additional possibilities that 
first a 'false' alarm is raised and later material is diverted (which means 
that this 'false' alarm is not really false from the global point of view, 
and 
that a diversion, which takes place in the i-th inventory period, i= l ... n-1, 
will be detected after the j-th period, j = 2, ••• ,n • 
In section 2.2 we will write down this explicitely for the case of two invento-
ry periods. 
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The set of strategies of the inspector is the set of significance thresholds 
which we call X. The determination of the optimal significance thresholds means 
according to the general discussion in Part I the solution of the non-cooperative 
two person game (X,{p}0YM,I,B) which in turn means the determination of the 
equilibrium points (x*; p~<, y*) defined by 
I(x*;p*,y*) > I(x;p*,y*) 
B(x*;p*,y*) > I(x*;p,y) 1 
where I and B are the payoffs to the two players. Again, for both cases, ab-
rupt and protractcd diversion, these equilibrium points can be found by a 
two step precedure 
Theorem 9 (Abel and Avenhaus 1980, 1981) 
The noncooperative two person games defined above can be solved by the following 
two auxiliary games: 
1) A noncooperative two person game 
E x : a := r a(i) 
i 
and where p has a fixed value. 
(X ,YM,I,B), er , where 
fixed } , 
In case e. = e for i = 1 .•• n it is sufficient to consider the conditioned expec-
J. 
ted payoffs in case of diversion, which for protracted diversion are 
"' n ( (i)) "' n ( (i)) I := - c • ß - ~ ai • 1 - ß , B := d • ß - ~ bi • 1- ß 
the equilibrium strategies of this game, x*(a) and y*, are defined by 
l(x*(a),y*,a) ~ l(x(a),y*,a) for as[O,l]. 
2. A non-cooperative two-person game ({a},{p}, 1~ ~*) with 
'V 'V 'V, 'V 
I*(a):= I(x*(a),y*,a) and B•(a):= B(x*(a),y*,a). 
The equilibrium strategies of this game, a* and p*, are defined by 
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If we compare this two step procedure with the one presented in Part I, we see 
that the first step game is no longer a zero sum game and furthermore, contains 
the original payoff parameters. 
Again, for the rest of this part we will consider only the first step game; 
before, however, we will come back once more to the problern of the two safe-
guards systems design criteria "overall probability of detection" and "short 
detection time." 
In the framework of the game theoretical model just described, there is only 
one criterion or "objective" of the inspector, namely his expected payoff. His 
interest in a short detection time is expressed by the different parameters 
ai, i=l,2, .•• ,n, his interest in a high overall probability of detection by the 
parameter c. The time points t., i=l, •.. ,n, for inventory taking are fixed a 
~ 
priori and not subject to optimization: This does not mean anything else than 
that between the given inventory taking times t 1 and ti+l of possible 
detection there is a difference in interest to the inspector; there is no 
difference in interest for time points closer to eaoh other. 
Contrary to the situation in Part I, where we needed only one decision criterion 
at the end of the reference time, in this part we have to define a decision 
criterion for each inventory period. Let ~(i) be the observed vector of MUF 
values until the end of the i-th inventory period, 
Z 
... (i) 
Then o(i) is defined as a map of 
the interval [o, 1] and may again 
(Z 1, ... ,Zi)' i=l, ... ,n. 
f b . z(i) the space o o servat~ons . = ~ 
be interpreted as the conditional 
{~(i)} into 
probability 
of choosing either the null hypothesis H or the alternative hypothesis H1, 
... (') 0 
given the observation ~ ~ and,furthermore~ given that all foregoing i-1 
decisions have led to the acceptance of H (otherwise, plant operations would 
0 
have been stoppedas already mentioned): 
o(H l~(i)) ~(i\z(i) 
0 (i) 
0- 0 
for 
o(H l~(i)) 
1-
i (i\z ~i) . 
Again, we have 
and therefore 
z (i) () z (i) 
o I 
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o(H ~~(i)) + 8(H ~~(i)) = I. 
o- I-
It should be noted that in Section 2.3 we consider a decision rule which 
permits the decision "no decision" (N) implying that we have in this case 
8 (Ho Ii (i)) ~(i) 82 (i) 
0 
8(i) o(Nii(i)) for i_(i\z~i) 
o(H l~(i)) 1- ~(i) 2 (i) - e: I 
and accordingly 
z(i) n N(i) = z(i) n z(i) = z(i) n z(i) 
o o I N I 
z (i) 
' ' 
If f0 (~(i)) and f 1 (~(i)) are the 
vector z(i) under the hypotheses 
the fal~e alarm probability a(i) 
probability density functions of the random 
H and H1, then in case of terminal decisions 0 
'1' f d . I ß(i) f and the probab1 1ty o etect1on - a ter 
the i-th inventory period are given by the expressions 
(i) f o (H lz (i)) . f (z(i)) dz (i) a 
Z (i) I - o-
1-ß(i) f 8 (H I z (i)) . f (z(i)) d (i) z • 
z (i) I - 1-
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As the events "false alarm after the i-th period" and "false alarm after the 
j-th period" are exclusive events for ifj (if after the i-th period an alarm 
is actuated, then plant operations are stopped therefore, an alarm after the 
j-th period requires that after the i-th period i<j, no alarm had been actuated), 
the overall false alarm probability a is given by the expression 
a = 
n 
E f ö(H jz(i)) 
i=l 
2
(i) 1 -
With the same argument we obtain the follmving expression for the overall 
probability of detection 
1-ß 
As in Part I, we will describe all non-randomized tests defined by 
by their acceptance regions (i) . I Z , 1= , ••• ,n. 
0 
Only in those sections where we 
determine Neyman-Pearson tests, we will have to make use of the full formalism 
developed so far. 
Second, we consider in this part an infinite reference time interval [o,oo], as 
we have seen in section 1.3 that for fixed reference time intervals it is dif-
ficult to formulate an appropriate criterion for the detection time, and as 
sequential methods for infinite reference time intervals have been discussed 
extensively in the last years in connection with the so-called near real time 
at!aountaney . We repeat , however, our objection from a political point of 
view, namely that for non-weapons NPT-signatory states it is important that 
at regular fixed points of time the safeguards authority should make a state-
ment about the compliance of the state operations with the NPT. 
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2. 1 Modified Neyman- Pearson Test 
In section 1.1 it has been pointed out that, if the distribution functions un-
der the null and under the alternative hypotheses are specified, the best test 
in the sense of overall probability of detection for a fixed false alarm proba-
bility is the Neyman- Pearson test. In the case of a sequential procedure for 
a finite nurober n of inventory periods its acceptance region is given by 
Theorem 10 
Given the random vector Z, generated sequentially, the density function of 
- Z (i)NP 
which is f0 (~) under H0 and f 1 (~ under H1 • Then the acceptance region 0 
of that test, which minimizes the probability of the error secend kind for the 
whole sequence for a fixed overall error first kind probability a, is given 
by 
f1 (~(i)) 
: f (z (i)) 
o-
->- l <--s 
- c- a. 
l. 
i = 1. .. n , 
where A has to be determined with the help of the fixed value of the error 
first kind probability according to 
1- a = 
n 
L 
i=1 J Z (i)NP 
0 
f ( z ( i) ) dz ( i) 
o-
and where c and a,, i= 1 .•• n, are the payoff parameters, introduced in the 
l. 
introduction of this part. 
Proof 
According to the introduction of this part the decision rule after the i - th 
inventory at time t. is 
l. 
if z(i)E:Z(i) 
0 
Again we restriet ourselves to terminal decisions so that either H0 or H1 must 
be accepted which means 
z (i), z~i)"' z~i) C/J, 
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and furthermore, 
According to the introduction to this part,the problern is to maximize the 
inspector's payoff ~ given by 
within the boundary of a fixed overall false alarm probability. This means 
explicitly that - if we use again the Lagrange formalism - we have to determine 
the free maximum of the form 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier. If we neglect the constant terms, the problern 
is reduced to the determination of the free maximum of the form 
As we h~ve 0 ~ o(H 1 !~(i)) 2 I, we maximize this expression by choice of o(HI!~(~)) = 1, if the integrand is positive and zero if it is negative. There-
fore, the modified Neyman-Pearson test has the rejection region for the decision 
at the i-th step 
2 (i)NP I 
and the acceptance region has the form given above, if we remember the assumption 
a. < c for i = 1 ••• n, which completes the proo:E. 
1 
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Protraated Diversion 
By going through the same formalism as used in Section I. I, we see that the 
acceptance region Z(i)NP for the i-th decision is given by 
0 
Z(i)NP 
0 
{Z(i): z(i)l'g(i)-I,M(i) < ln c=~. +-} • M(i)l, g(i)-l,~(i)}, 
~ 
where ~(i) is the covariance matrix of the first i MUF variables ~(i), and 
where ~(i) 1 = (M1, ••. ,Mi)' i=l, •.. ,n. Therefore, the relation between the false 
alarm probability a and the Lagrange multiplier A is explicitly given by 
-A 
n ( ln c::a,-
1-a = L: <i> ~ 
i=l I -1 . 
/M(i) I .t:(i) •M(~) 
The payoff to the operator in case of illegal behavior is given by 
where ß(i) is given by 
_ _!_, 
2 
Therefore, the optimal diversion strategy M* with e 1 •M* =M is given- if we 
neglect constant terms - by the free maximum of the form 
L:[(-d-b.)•<i>f.i..k'(i)l ·~(i)-I•M(i) - ln ~ ) - K·M.J, 
. ~ \;-- - I ~ ~ IM(i) I •l: (i) -I ·M(i) 
= -
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where K is the Lagrange parameter. Here, it has to be noted that A also depends 
on the diversion strategy ~:A = A(~) via the false alarm relation. This means 
in turn that the equilibrium strategy of the inspector is to choose the accept-
ance region Z(i)NP as follows: 
0 
2 (i)NP 
0 
Naturally, this program cannot be carried through analytically. Nevertheless, 
some interesting features of this approach can be observed: 
- In general the test procedure after the i-th inventory period makes use of 
all foregoing MUF variables Z., j=l ... i. This should be kept in mind if we 
J 
discuss another procedure in the next section. 
The acceptance regions after different inventories are different not only 
because of the different values of a. which express the operator's interest in 
~ 
early detection, but they are also different for fixed diversion strategies. 
- In the case n=2 the relation between the Lagrange multiplier A and the false 
alarm probability a is given by 
cr MI 1-a <P(-1 ln -A I --+ 2 -) + MI c-a 1 crl 
M2 2pM1M2 
M2 
I 2 
-z- + 0~) 1-p 2 -A I crl crlcr2 
M2 M2 
ln -- + 2 2 2pM 1M2 
c-a2 1-p I 2 
-z- +-
crlcr2 2 
crl cr2 
and the formtobe minimized with respect to (M 1,M2 : M1+M2 M) is given as 
I MI cr I -A ( (-d-b )·<P(- •--- · ln --)+(-d-b )•<P I 2 cr I M1 c-a I 2 
1-p 2 -A 
M2 
. ln + 
2pM 1M2 
M2 c-a2 I +_l_ 
-z-
crlcr2 2 
crl cr2 
M2 2pM1M2 
M2 
I 2 
-z- + 0~) I crl crlcr2 +-· + K. (MI +M2) ' 2 1-p 2 
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which means that in this ve~y simple case it is not possible to obtain 
an explicit solution for general parameter values. 
Abrupt Diversion 
Let us first consider the very special abrupt diversion 
!' ~ (M,O, ... ,O) 
and assume that the inspector knows that the operator will either behave le-
gally, or use this strategy. Then the acceptance regions z (i)NP are given 
0 
by 
2 
{Z(i): z
1 
< : 1 ·\~(:i.)\·ln -;\ 
c-a. 
~ 
I 
+ 2 . M} 
which means that only z1 is used as decision variable, but that all n tests 
are performed if no detection takes place. In the same way it can be shown 
that in case the diversion strategy consists in diverting the amount M of 
material during the i-th inventory period, n-i+l tests,beginning after the i-th 
inventory and using only z. as decision variable, are performed. ~ 
For a general abrupt diversion strategy, namely that in the i-th inventory 
period the amount M is diverted with probability q,, i ~ 1 ... n, with L q. ~ 1, 
~ i ~ 
the density function under the alter,native hypothesis is given in section 1.1 
However, as already in the nonsequential case it was impossible to determine 
analytically optimal strategies - even for the case of only two inventory pe-
riods - it is clear that here, in the sequential case it is even more so, 
which means that only numerical studies can help to find appropriate solutions. 
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2.2 A Special Sequential Approach for a Fixed Reference Time 
In this section we will consider again the test procedure based on 
Stewart's estimate for the starting inventory which we have used already in 
Section 1. 1. 
Let ~. be the modified MUF variable for the i-th inventory period as defined 
1 
in Section 1.3: 
~1.:= a. 1·Z. 1+Z. 1- 1- 1 for i=2, ••. n, 
Then the acceptance region Z(i) for the decision after the i-th inventory period 
to be discussed here is given by 
Z (i) = & . : ~. <s.}. 
0 1 1- 1 
It should be noted that for the i-th decision only the modified MUF variable 
for the i-th inventory period is used and not the foregoing ones. 
Let a. be the probability that a false alarm is g~v~n after the i-th inventory 
1 
period, expressed by 
a. = )- r f (z.)dz .. 
1 z<i) o 1 1 
o,..., 
where f tz.) is the density 
0 l. 
of Z. under the 
1 
null hypothesis H . 
0 
Because of the independence of the modified MUF variables, 
first giving a false alarm after the i-th inventory period 
(i) 
a 
i-1 
a.· rr (1-a.), i=2, ... ,n, 
1 j=1 J 
a 
( 1) 
the probability of 
a(i) is expressed by 
The probability of giving a false alarm a is then expressed by 
a = ~ a(i) 
i=1 
n 
1- rr ( 1-a.) , 
i=1 ·1 
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as can be shown by complete induction (an analogaus formula had been used in 
Section 1.3 in connection with the conditional,expected detection time). 
Protraated Diversion 
Furthermore, let 1-ß. be the probability that a diversion is detected after the 
1 
i-th inventory period, given by 
1-ß. 
1 
1- r f 1 ( Z , ) dz , 1 
. z (i) 1 1 
0 
"' where f 1 (zi) is the density of z. under the alternative hypothesis H1 • 1, 
The probability of first detecting a diversion after the i-th inventory period 
1 ß(i) . . b - 1s g1ven y 
1-ß (i) 
i-1 
(1-ß.)· TI ß,, j=2, .•. ,n, 
1 j=1 J 
The overall probability of detection 1-ß is then given by 
1-ß 1-Tiß., 
• 1 
1 
as can.~be shown again by complete induction. 
Explicitely a. and 1-ß. are given by 1 1 
'V 
s. E 1 (Z.) 
a. <I> (--2:.) and 1-ß. = <I> ( 1 - u ) 1 cr. 1 cr. 1-a. 1 1 1 
where si is the significance threshold of the i-th test, and where E 1 (~i) is 
defined as in Section 1.3. 
The expected payoffs to the inspector and to the operator are given by 
n n i-1 n i-1 
I (-c TI ß.- ~ a.·(1-ß.)· TI ß.)•p+(- ~ e.•a.· TI (1-a.))·(1-p), 
1'=1 1 . 1 1 1 . 1 J . 1 1 1 . 1 J 1= J= 1= j= 
n n i-1 n i -1 
B = ( d · TI ß. - ~ b. ' ( 1-ß. ) • TI ß.) • p+ (- ~ f. · a. • TI (1-a.)) • ( 1-p) • 
i=1 1 i=1 1 1 j=1 J i=1 1 1 j=1 J 
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In the following paragraphs we will adapt the analysis to the case n=2 and con-
sider only the first step game introduced ~n the introduction to this part, 
namely the "illegal11 game with a fixed value of the overall false alarm probabil-
i ty; furthermore we assume e 1 = e2 . 
· The payoff parameters and the expected payoffs are given explicitly in Fig. 4. 
The conditional expected payoffs I and ~. introduced at the beginning of this 
part, are given by 
I (a2-c)·ß 1•ß2+(a 1-a2)·ß 1-a 1 
~ = (b2+d)·ßl•ß2+(bl-b2)·ßl-bl. 
As we are interested p~imari~y in the optimal strategies, we consider only a 
'V 'V 'V 'V linear transformation I and B of I and B: 
'V 
~ = ßi•ß2+AB'ßl' 
Explicitly these transformed payoffs are given by 
'V MI a·M1+M2 I<.~·!!) <i> (UI-a - -) · (A +:I!>(U - (J ) ) 
I cr 1 I 1-a2 2 
'V MI a·M1 +M2 'V 
<i>(UI-a B(_c:_,!!) - -)·(A +~(U - (J ) ) , 
I cr I B l-a2 2 
where a 1 and a2 and M1 and M2 have to fulfil the boundary conditions 
( 1-a ) • ( 1-a ) = 1-a, I 2 M. 
'V 'V 
The equilibrium points a* and M* of the game ({_c;:}, {!!},I, ~) are determined by 
the relations 
'V 'V 
I(_c:_*,!!*) > r<_c:_,!!*); 
they are fulfilled if the following two equations are satisfied: 
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Legal behaviour of the operator 
( 1-a ) · ( 1-a ) I 2 
0 
(I-a ) ·a I 2 
0· (1-a )·(1-a )-e •(1-a )•a -e •a I 2 2 I 2 I I 
Diversion of material by 
the operator 
-c 
-c·ß •ß -a •ß •(1-ß )-a · (1-ß) I 2 2 I 2 I I 
[-e · (I-a )·a -e ·a] • (1-p)+[-c·ß •ß -a •ß · (1-ß )-a · (1-ß )] •p 2 I 211 1221 2 I I 
0 d 
-b2 
(1-a ) · ( 1-a ) I 2 ßl•ß2 ßl·(l-ß2) 1-ßl 
0•(1-a )•(1-a )-f •(1-a )•a -f •a I 2 2 I 211 d·ßl•ß2-b2·ßl· (l-ß2)-bl· (1-ßl) 
[ -f •(J-a )·a -f ·a ]·(1-p)+rd·ß •ß -b •ß ·(1-ß )-b ·(1-ß )]·p 2 I 211 L: 1221 2 I I 
Figure 4: Extensive form of the sequential safeguards procedure for 
independent test statistics, Section 2.2: payoffs, probabilities, 
conditional expected payoffs and expected payoffs (ns: non-
significant, s: significant, p: probability of diversion). 
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MI 
- -) • <I>' (U 
a 1 1-a2 
o. 
Here ci>'(.) is again the firstderivative of <I>(.). 
If we use instead of these two equations the ratio of these and again the second 
equation, we get the following determinants for a* and M*: 
-ci>(U 1-a I 
dU I-a 
I 0 2 
--=-- + -~---a 
dU I-a 
2 
together with the boundary conditions for ~ and ~· 
For A1=AB the first equation is simplified to become 
a • 
I 
which with 
dU I-a 
I 0 2 
--:--- + --. da 1 1-a 
dU I-a 
2 0 
0 
a. MI +M2. 1-p ) o, 
0 2 °2 
dU I-a 
2 
is equivalent to 
dU I-a 
I 
dU I-a 
2 
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c- I 2 
- v2'IT • exp(-·U ) 2 1-a1 
I 2 cr 2 
-cr •exp(-· U ) + I-a I 2 l-a 1 
.J 2 ) 
exp (- · U 2 1-a 2 
1-a 
o. 
Thus, we see that in this case the optimal strategy of the inspector is the 
sameasthat in the non-sequential aase~ treated in Section 1.3 and represented 
graphically in Figs. Ia and lb. 
It can be understood intuitively that under certain circumstances, i.e. for 
some parameter value combinations, the optimal strategies in the sequential model 
are the same as in our non-sequential game, as both players choose their 
strategies already at the beginning of the game; therefore, the game is not really 
sequential. It is, however, not easy to understand the condition for this equality 
of optimal strategies: If we assume 
the condition AI AB ~s equivalent to the condition 
I - Kl K -J B 
c I d - -+ 
a2 b2 
which still represents a relation between four parameters which,obviously,does 
not lend itself to an intuitive interpretation. Furthermore, it is a relation 
between parameters which, <:>;n the one hand, express the payoff to the two parties in 
case of early detection (Kl and KB), and parameters which,on the other hand, 
express the payoff to the strategies in case of secure detection (c, a2' d and b2). 
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As, however, these two criteria are somehow independent, this relation can 
only hold in very special cases. 
The optimal strategy ~* of the operator in any case depends on the derived 
payoff parameter AB; therefore, also the overall probability of detection depends 
on AB, First numerical calculations (Heidl and Schmidt (1980)) indicate that in 
fact ~* strongly depends on the value of AB' but that the overall probability of 
detection practically does not depend on the value of AB. 
Abrupt Diversion 
Under the assumption that the operator diverts the total arnount M of material 
with probability q,, i = 1 •.• n, in the i-th inventory period, L q, = 1, it is 
~ i ~ 
even difficult to formulate the expected payoffs to the inspector and to the 
operator in an understandable way, as because of the construction of the trans-
forrned MUF variables such a diversion still can be detected after later inven-
tory'periods. Therefore, we will consider only the case of two inventory periods. 
The payoff pararneters, the probabilities, the conditioned expected payoffs and 
the expected payoffs are given in Figure 5; according to Section 1.3 and accor-
ding to the assurnption that the total amount M of material is diverted either 
in the first or in the secend inventory period, the probability to detect a 
diversion a.fter the i-th inventory period is, if in fact in that inventory pe-
riod the material is diverted 
where 
1 - ß. = <:[> ( ~- u1 ) , i = 1, 2,... , ~ (j. -<X. 
~ ~ 
2 
o i is the variance of the transforrned MUF variables z. , i = 1, 2 
~ 
= var(z 1) =var(I +T -I ) =: o1
2 
0 1 1 
Furtherrnore, because of 
in case of diversion in the first inventory period we have the probability 
2 a·M 1-ß := <P (- - ul_", ) 
(j 2 "'2 
that this diversion will be detected after the second inventory period. 
,_ 
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Figure 5: Extensive form of the sequential safeguards procedure for 
independent test statistics, Section 2.5: payoffs, probabilities, 
conditional expected payoffs and expected payoffs (ns: non-
significant, s: significant, q: probability of diversion in the 
first period, p: probability of diversion at all). 
a:> 
.... 
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Let q be the probability that the operator will divert the amount M of material 
in the first inventory period. Then according to our assumptions and as already 
denoted in Figure 5, the payoff to the operator is 
B·= [-f · (1-a ) ·a -f ·a J · (1-p) + 
' 2 I 2 I I 
+ 1-d;ß ·s2-b ·s ·(I-S 2)-b ·(1-ß )]·q+[-d·(l-a )·ß -b ·(1-a )·(1-s )-t.= . I 12 I ' I I I I 2 22 I 2 
-b ·a]·(l-q)]·p 21 I 
and his set of strategies is 
{(p, q) : o .:::. P, q < n ; 
the payoff to the inspector is 
and his set of strategies is the same as before: 
Now, it can be shown again that this game can be solved by solving two auxiliary 
games, the second one of which being characterized by a fixed value of p and a 
fixed overall false alarm probability a (Abel and Avenhaus 1981). In case of 
e 1 = e 2 it is sufficient to consider the conditioned expected payoffs in case 
of diversion, 
; . = [ -c • ß • ß 2- a • ß • (1-ß 2 ) - a • ( 1-ß ) ] • q + r -c • (1-a ) • ß - a • (1-a ) • (1-ß ) 
. 1 12 1 11 1 1 2 22 1 2 
-a • a ] • (1-q) •-
21 1 
B·=r-d·ß ·ß
2
-b ·ß • o-ß
2
l-b ·(1-ß l]·q+[-d· o-a l ·ß -ß · (1-a l·(1-ß l 
• L 1 12 1 11 1 1 2 22 1 2 
-b21 • al] ' (1-q) 
- 83 -
which means that the second game to be considered is 
( { (<X1 '<X2) : ( 1 - <X1) • ( 1 - <X2) = 1 -<X} ' { q : 0 :$; q ~ 1}' I,B ) . 
Only this game we will consider in the following. 
Let us put furthermore 
i.e., let us assume that neither for the inspect8r nor for the operator there 
is a difference if the abrupt diversion is detected immediately. Then the 
euqilibrium conditions are 
where 
for q E Y , 
b11 + d 
Jl3 = b12 + d 
One realizes immediately 
;\ - ;\ = 1 3 1 and J1 3 - J1 1 = 1 , 
which means that, e.g., Al and Jll can be eliminated. If one assumes, further-
more 
one gets 
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which leads to 
1 < A3 1 < 113 • 
If one introduces the parameters 
than one sees that the payoff functions 1 and ~ and therefore the equilibrium 
strategies depend only on the four parameters A,K,\1 and e instead of the origi-
nal ten parameters, with 
1 < )., , o < K < 1 , 1 < 11 , o < e < 1 • 
(In the case of protracted diversion we arrived at two parameters instead of 
the original six.) 
Explicitely the equilibrium strategies are determin.ed by the relations 
ß1 (o:1*). (ll-1-ß2(o:2*))-e 'll' o:1*-ll. (1-o:1*). ß2(o:2*) = o 
(1 - 0:1 *) • (1 - 0:2 *) = 1 - 0: 
Numerical calculations (Abel and Avenhaus 1981b) indicate that the optimal 
single false alarm probabilities o:1* and o:2* may be very different in case 
of protracted and of abrupt diversion, however, that the resulting overall 
probabilities of detection are nearly identical. This means that the inspector 
must not worry too much about the strategy chosen by the operator. Nevertheless 
it should be kept in mind that the optimal total false alarm probabilities o:* 
resulting from the general game, may have different values for the two di-
version scenarios. 
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2.3 Sequential Approaches for Infinite Time Horizons 
In general it is impossible to construct auxiliary garnes which are independent 
of the payoff pararneters as we have seen. Therefore, in this section we dis-
cuss safeguards procedures frorn a purely statistical point of view which, how-
ever, rneans that we are no langer able to deterrnine 'optimal' strategies. It 
is also rnuch rnore difficult in case of sequential procedures to deterrnine the 
probability of detection for any diversion strategy as we have seen in the fore-
going two sections. Therefore, we will not discuss explicitely the cases of 
protracted and abrupt diversion even though rnany sirnulation studies have been 
perforrned recently (Pike 1980, Sellinschegg 1981). Even the false alarrn proba-
bility for fixed intervals of time cannot be related to the significance 
thresholds in general, instead, the concept of the average run length is the 
central one, as we also saw already in section 1.3. 
Application of Wald's test 
Shipley (1980) 1) has approached the problern of the deterrnination of the optimal 
test statistics for a sequential test procedure at fixed points of time 
t., i=1,2, .•. , in the following way: 
1 
After the i-th inventory taking at timet., i=1,2, .•. , a testwill be perforrned 
1 
which has three different outcornes: 
Accept H and continue, or 
0 
accept H1 and stop plant operations, or 
make no decision. 
It should be noted that Shipley writes in case of the third decision that 
another data point should be taken without saying what this means. In 
addition, he does not say explicitly "stop plant operations" in case of 
the second decision, We will corne back to this point. 
According to this test procedure, the space of 
test must be partitioned into three sets z~i), 
· z(i) f observat1ons or 
z(i) and z(i) with 
N ' 1 
the i-th 
1) I . I 
n Sh1pley s document a large list of papers of the Los Alamos Group is 
given to which explicit reference is rnade at this point. 
and the following decision rule 
ö 
where "N" indicates 11 no decision". 
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ö (Ho li(i)) 
ö (N Ii (i)) 
ö (H I I i ( i) ) ' 
i Pi i Let P and P j=O,I, be the probabilities of no detection, detection ND.' D. N.' 
J J J 
and no decision under the hypothes{s H. after the i-th inventory taking. 
J 
Obviously, one has for these probabilities for i=1,2, ... 
Pi + p~ + p~ for H ND 0 
0 0 0 
i + Pi + p~ for Hl, PND 
I NI I 
Furthermore, let the corresponding overall probabilities be PND.' PN. and PD.' 
J J J 
j=O,I, givenby 
PND. E f ö(H lz(i))·f.(z(i))dz(i) 
J i z (i) 0 - J -
PD. z: f ö(H lz(i))•f.(z(i))dz(i) 
J i Z (i) I - J -
where f.(z(i)) are the densities of the first i MUF variables under the hypo-] -
theses j. 
Now Shipley proceeds as follows: He is interested in determining those tests 
which have the properties 
PND 
0 
+PD -+1, 
0 
-+I 
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implying that the test terminates eventually. To achieve this, he 
uses a modified Neyman-Pearson criterion in which both the values of PD and PD 
0 
are fixed (which is possible because the terminal point is not fixed) and mini-
m1.zes the sum of the probabilities of not making the right decision (including 
no decision) under the two hypotheses H
0 
and H1. This means that he uses the 
objective function 
1-PND 
0 
I 
where a and ß are the desired values of PD 
are Lagrange multipliers. 0 
and PD , respectively, and Al and A2 I 
The solution of this optimization problem, obtained in exactly the same manner 
asthat in Section 2. I, leads Shipley to the following test: The three sets 
zCi) zCi) and zCi) are given by 
o ' N I 
z (i) {Z (i) : 
f(Z(i)!H) I - I } 
f(Z(i)!H) 
< 
>; 0 
- 0 
2Ci) {Z (i): _I_< 
f(Z(i)!H) 
- I 
<Al} N A2 f(Z(i) IR ) 
- 0 
2 Ci) z (i): 
f(Z(i) IR ) 
- I i= I , 2, ••• , Al < f(~(i) !Ho/ I 
which means that one has again a likelihood ratio test, this time with two 
thresholds. 
Without going into further details of the analysis (e.g. the thresholds Al and 
A2 in general cannot be expressed explicitly by a and ß; therefore, approximations 
have tobe used which lead to the thresholds T
0 
and T1, give~ by 
T _ß_ > _I and T = I-ß < A ) 
o 1-a - A 2 I a - I ' 
we will give some general comments on this procedure: 
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i) The criteria of overall probability of detection and false alarm probability 
do not take into account the aspect of timeliness which according to our 
discussion at the beginning of this part is the only justification for 
sequential procedures with their very strong implications for eventually stop-
ping plant operations. 
It should be noted that also in the procedure described in the foregoing 
sections the "overall" payoffs were optimized; these overall payoffs, however, 
contained parameters expressing the gains and losses in the cases of early 
and late detection, respectively. 
Furthermore, the overall probabilities of detection and of false alarm 
refer to an interval of time the end point of which is a random variable and 
may be infinite. This is not in accordance with the concept of a fixed 
reference time interval, after which it shall be decided definitely whether 
or not the operator behaved legally. 
ii) The concept of "no decision" can hardly be realized in practice: What action 
will be taken which is different from the action taken in case of the decis-
ion "accept H 1 ?" 
It is clear that Wald's sequential test (1977) has its merits, e.g., in the 
area of quality control: Let the problern be given that a production lot has 
to be accepted if the percentage of bad items does not exceed a given value 
(null hypothesis); otherwise it has tobe rejected. One starts with a random 
sample of given size and draws additonal items if no de~ision is taken. This 
way the expected sample size for given values of a and ß is smaZZer than in 
the case in which one would work with a fixed sample size and no region of 
indifference. 
A sequence of inventory periods, however, represents a stochastic process, 
the different realizations of which require different actions; thus, Wald's 
theory simply does not seem to represent the appropriate analytical tool for 
this problem. 
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Page's Test 
We will introduce Page's test (Page 1954) quite generally before discussing 
its application to the sequence of inventory periods problem. 
The classical statistical theory for testing a hypotheses H against a spe-
o 
cific alternative H1 , based on a fixed sample of observations, was developed 
by considering the likelihood functions of the data under each of the hypo-
theses; examples were given in Section 1.1 and 1.2. This situationwas later 
modified to take into account situations where the observations arrive one 
at a time (Wetherill 1975), and this theory was used by Page (1954) to develop 
his CUSUM test for the detection of a shift in the mean value of a random va-
riable observed at regular intervals and goes as follows. 
2 Given a sequence of random variables x 1 ,x2 , ••• with known variances a and 
expectation values (Jtarget values') zero under the null hypothesis H . In 
0 
case of a onesided test the null hypotheses H is rejected after the i-th 
0 
observation, if 
S 0 : = max ( 0, S 0 1 + X 0 - k) > h ~ ~- ~ 
where S := o, and where k and h are called reference value and decision 
0 
value. Explicitely it means that H is rejected after the first step if 
0 
max ( 0, X 1 - k) > h 
it iso rejected after the second step if 
max(o,s1 + x2 - k) 
• { max (o,x 1 + x2 - 2k) 
max (o,x2 - k) 
for ;::: h , 
and so on. In words, this procedure means that all variables,which are normalized 
to zero expectation values, are added unless their sum is smaller than the re-
ference value, and that the null hypothesis is rejected if the decision varia-
ble h is passed. It should be noted that, contrary to the test discussed in 
section 1.4, the observationsarenot simply added and tested. 
Before discussing the properties of this test procedure, it should be mentioned 
that the so-called V- masque-teohnique (see, e.g., van Dobben 1968) represents 
a graphical technique for the application of this test. However, as this tech-
nique is not easytobe understood, i.e., it is not easy to relate the parame-
ters of the V- masque to statistical quantities, and as the test can easily be 
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performed with the help of small computers, we will not go into further de-
tails. 
The test is usually characterized by three quantities, namely by P(z), N(z) 
and L(z). Here, P(z) is the probability that a test, which starts at the 
value z of the test statistic, goes below zero; N(z) is the expected sample 
size of a single test which starts at z and ends either below zero ore above h, 
and L(z) is the expected sample size, i.e., the expected nurober of observa-
tions until h is passed. L(z) is also called average run Zength. 
Note: It should be observed that we consider single tests, i.e., 
series of observations which either end at zero or h, and series 
of tests, which end at h. 
In generalexplizite expressions canhot be given for these quantities, how-
ever, integral equations can be derived under the assumption that all Ob-
servations are from the same sample space characterized by the distribution 
F(x) and density f(x) (van Dobben 1968, Wetherill 1977). In order to achieve 
this, we start with the value z of the test statistic and assume that the ob-
served value of the next sample is x. Then according to the definition we get 
the new 'score' for the test statistic 
0 
z+x-k 
h 
for 
for 
for 
z+x:5k 
k<z+x~h+k 
z+x~h+k. 
From the definition of P(z), N(z) and L(z) we therefore get immediately the 
equations 
k-z-h h 
P (z) = F (k -,z) + J f (x) • P (z + x- k) dx = F (k- z) + J f (y + k- z) P (y) dy , 
k-z 
h-z-k 
N(z)=1+ r f(x) •N(z+x-h) 
~ 
k-z 
h 
0 
h 
dx = 1 + J f (y- k - z) • N (y) dy , 
0 
L(z) = 1+L(O) • F(k-z) + J L(y) • f(y+k-z) dy. 
ö 
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Furthermore, there exists a relation between L(z), N(z) and P(z) which heuristi-
cally can be understood as follows: The probability that - starting from zero -
exactly s tests are performed until the decision is taken is 
P(O)s-1 • (1-P(O)), s::: 1,2, ... , 
thereföre, the expected number of tests is 
Co 
E(S) ::: L 
s=1 
s-1 
s . p (0) • ( 1 - p (0)) ::: 1 
1 - p (0) 
Thus, one expects that during the whole test procedure the statistic goes 
1 
1 _ P (O) - 1 times below zero and thereafter above h which means 
L (0) ::: 1 _ ~ (O) • ( N1 (0) • P (0) +Nu (0) • ( 1 - P (0)) • 
As, however, the average sample size N(O) of a single test starting at zero, 
1 is the average sample size under the condition that it ends at zero, N (0), 
times the probability that it ends at zero, P(O), plus the average sample 
size under the condition that it ends at h, Nu(O), times the probability that 
it ends at h, 1 - P (0), we finally get 
N(O) L ( 0) ::: -:---~-':-:-1 - p (0) 
Finally, we get a relation between L(z), N(z) and P(z) as follows. 
The average run length L(z), starting from z, is the average run length of 
a single test, L(O), times the probability that the single test considered 
before ends at zero, P (z) - if it ended at h the whole procedure would have 
come to an end. Thus 
L(z) ::: N(z) + L(O) • P(z). 
Exact solutions of the integral equations for special distributions have been 
given by van Dobben (1968). Numerical procedures for their solutions have been 
proposed by Kemp (1958); approximations are given by Kemp (1967 a,b). 
An appropriate relation between h and P(O) can be established by comparing 
Page's test with the sequential probability ratio test by Wald (1947) in case 
the random variables X,, i== 1,2, ••• are normally distributed with variances 
~ 
var (X.) == cr 2 for i::: 1, 2, ••• and 
~ 
E (X.) 
1. 
-- { 0 
ll 
for 
H 
0 
- 92 -
i= 1,2, .... 
Wald's test requires to 
ll n ll 2' 
continue the procedure if ln B <- • X: x -- • -< ln A , 
cr 2 i i 2 cr 2 
reject H if ll l: n ll 2 ln A cr2 • x. --·-;::: 0 i 1. 2 az 
reject H1 if L. L: n ll
2 
ln B X --•- < . oz . i 2 cr 2 -1. 
It has been shown by Wald, that the following relations hold between the 
error first and second kind probabilities, a and ß, and A and B : 
Thus, for 
A:::;~ and 
a 
1 - ß 
:=-a-
B ;:::_ß_ 
1 - a 
and B ~ B' := __ ß_ 
1-a 
and furthermore, a,ß << 1,1, the procedure has tobe continued if 
ll cr 2 ln ß < L: xl.. - n • -2 < -i ll 
ln a 
If we compare this procedure tothat of Page's test, we can identify one series 
of Page's test with Wald's test, which means under H, that a=l-P(O), and 
0 
therefore 
k = ll 2' ln (1-P(O)). 
It should be noted, however that the probability P(O) does not give any infor-
mation about the frequency of false alarms thus, in the sense of what has been 
said in section 1.3, the significance threshold h should be related to L(O). 
Page's testwas derived under the assumption that the observations were in-
dependent of one another, which might suggest that it is only relevant to the 
independert.ly transformed MUF variables, considered in sections 1 • 3 and 2. 2. 
However, it has been shown by Bagshaw and Johnson (1975) that, if Page's test 
is applied to a stream of negatively correlated Observations - in our case the 
original MUF variables - the false alarm rate is not greatly affected. This 
suggests that the test will perform better for negatively correlated data than 
it does for independent observations. 
- 93 -
Pike, Woods and Rose (1980, 1980 a,b) commented an the basis of their extensive 
numerical studies the properties of this procedure as follows: The alterna-
tive hypothesis is accepted only when sufficient evidence has been accumula-
ted (sequentially) and each time the alternative hypothesis is accepted, the 
values used in the decision are discarded and the process begins anew. Hence, 
if a constant losssuddenlybegins after a lang time without any lass, the 
test is likely to signal quickly, since it does not wish to be confused by an 
early sequence of observations when no lass was occuring. On the other hand, 
the CUMUF test and many of those based an minimum variance unbiased estimates, 
continues to use all the MUF values until a positive signal is given so that 
a lass which begins late in the sequence may be masked by a lang early run of 
acceptable values. 
Power One Test 
Recently it has been proposed by Cobb (1981) and by Shipley (1981) to use the 
so-called power one test which has been developed by Robbins and coworkers 
(1969, 1970), and which goes as follows: 
Let x1 ,x2 , ••• be a sequence of independent normally distributed random varia-
bles with variances 
var (X, ) = 0? 1 i = 1 1 2 1 • • • 
~ ~ 
and with zero expectation values under the null hypothesis, The null hypothesis 
is rejected if 
k 
I: 
i=l 
where a > o, m > 0. It has been shown, now, that the overall false alarm pro-
bability of this test is bounded according to 
()( ::::; 2<!>~a) • exp 0 aa2) ' 
and furthermore, that for the alternative hypothesis is H1 : E(Xi) = ll > 0 
for i= 1,2, ..• the power of this test tends towards one for an infinite series 
of variables. 
As these properties of the test hold only for independent random variables, it 
can only be applied to independently transformed MUF variables, e.g., to those 
used in section 1.3. The advantages of this test compared to those sequential 
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tests discussed so far are obvious; it remains to be shown, how this test 
works in case of different alternative hypotheses, i.e., diversion scenarios. 
Preliminary calculations by Sellinschegg and Eieking (1981), based on with 
the help of Kalman Filter techniques transformed MUF-variables indicate good 
performance characteristics for various diversion scenarios. 
2.4 Summary of Part II 
Having in mind not only the objective of optimizing the overall probability of 
detecting a diversion of nuclear material during a finite reference time, but 
also the objective of early detecting any diversion, we proceeded in this part 
along two different lines: First, we tried to model the interest of the in-
spector to detect a diversion already at timet., and not only at timet. 1 -L L+ 
this means to face the problern of estimating the values of the payoff parame-
ters which describe this interest of the inspector (and also that of the opera-
tor). Second, because of this problern we tried to avoid the use of payoff pa-
rameters and instead to take the expected detection time as optimization cri-
terion. We realized, by the way, that such a criterion cannot be derived from 
a game theoretical model. As this approach posed conceptual problems in the 
case of a finite reference time, we considered infinite reference time, and 
we were led to the new concept of average run length. 
Whereas in the static approach it was possible to find explicite and intui-
tive solutions of the optimization problems, this was not possible for any of 
the sequential models. Partly, this is so because sequential models are more 
difficult than static ones from an analytical point of view - which naturally 
reflects inherent difficulties. More important, however, is the fact that it 
is much more difficult to formulate quantitatively diversion scenarios: How 
do we describe protracted and abrupt diversion of a finite goal quantity in 
case of an infinite time horizon? 
In the last chapter we will try to draw some conclusions from the experience 
gained so far. 
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CONCLUSION 
Where do we stand? 
Let us repeat once more the nuclear material safeguards objectives as they 
are agreed today: First, any diversion of nuclear material should be detected 
as securely as possible - high probability of detection - and second, it 
should be detected as early as possible - short expected detection time. 
In addition, there are ideas about which diversion strategies have to be met 
by a safeguards system: they range from protraated diversion of small amounts 
of material until abrupt diversion of large amounts. If possible, aZZ strate-
gies lying between these extremes should be met as well. 
In order to meet these widespread and partially conflicting requirements on 
the safeguards system, a variety of test procedures have been developed by 
various research groups araund the world, the most important variants of which 
have been presented in this paper. 
Furthermore, there was a complementary effort to develop estimation proce-
dures; their primary purpose was to obtain in this way best test statistics 
(from the plant operator's point of view they also should serve the purpose of 
estimating lasses). With the exception of Stewart's estimate of the starting 
inventory, they were not presented in this paper. Just this example, however, 
showed that best estimates do not necessarily leadtobest tests: Stewart's 
estimate did not lead to the Neyman-Pearson test. 
Where do we stand now? We have seen that the problern may be considered as 
solved if the only objective is the probability to detect the diversion of a 
given amount of material in a given reference time. More than that, this ob-
jective can be derived from a non-cooperative two person game, if we consider 
the false alarm probability as a parameter of the problem. 
Sanborn (1980) has formulated a different criterion for the optimi-
zation of inspector's and operator's strategies: He defined the 
information I(H 1 ,H0 ;Z) as the expected value of the natural logarithm 
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of the ratio of the density functions L1 (Z) of the observations 
under the two hypotheses H1 and H0 • The question to be answered is 
whether or not this criterion can be derived from first principles 
such that one can argue that it will be used by both opponents, 
inspector and operator, for the optimization of their strategies. 
Things get difficult, if we introduce the objective of timeliness of detection. 
As this concept requires by its very nature immediate action after an alarm, 
we have to consider sequential procedures which makes the game theoretical 
model much more complicated; it has become clear that no simple timeliness 
criterion can be derived from these models. Furthermore, we have difficulties 
to define any expected detection time, as long as we consider finite reference 
times - this, however, we did in order to specify the probability of detection 
and the false alarm probability for a given reference time. If we consider in-
finite reference times, we can define the expected detection time in a satis-
fying way and furthermore, the average run length under the null and under the 
alternative hypotheses may take the role of the probability of detection and 
of the false alarm probability, however, we run into new problems: 
First, we have no final decisions at fixed points of time which is an impor-
tant political requirement, as we pointed out in section 1.3. Second, we can 
no longer specify the strategies of protracted and abrupt diversion for given 
total goal quantities as easily as in the static or in the sequential, fixed 
reference time approach. 
It should be mentioned that in view of these latter problems some 
time ago it has been proposed to use "batteries of tests" where 
every test is taylored for a specific diversion scenario. Because 
of the difficulty, that the overall false alarm probability of such 
a battery can no longer be kept under control, experts agreed that 
this proposal was not practical. 
Now, what conclusions can be drawn at this stage of development, and which 
further actions should be taken? 
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First, politicians, responsible safeguards authority representatives and 
plant operators have to be asked to more carefully specify the objectives 
and boundaries of the safeguards system: How important is early detection 
compared to detection with high probability after some time? What are the 
diversion seenarios (protracted, abrupt, finite or infinite time horizon)? 
Which ones have to be considered? How many inventories, and what kind of 
inventories can economic plant operation tolerate? Will plant operations be 
stopped if the alternative hypothesis is accepted? What are the second and 
third action levels? How important is it for non-weapons states to get 
official statements from the side of the safeguards authority at fixed points 
of time (e.g., once a year)? And so on. This does not mean that one hopes to 
arrive in this way at parameter value estimates; it will rather permit to 
better structure the procedures and, consequently, the models. For example, 
the answer to questions like those raised above, should lead to a decision 
whether or not sequential test procedures will be applied. 
Second, it is clear that in practice only sing~e and simple test procedures 
(see, e.g., Woods and Pike 1981) will be applied which may differ from plant 
type to plant type. Therefore, it is necessary to perform concrete case 
studies in order to evaluate the sensitivity of the procedures: This analysis 
of sampling procedures in connection with data verification problems (Aven-
haus and Beedgen (1980), Beedgen and Neu (1980)) showed that "second best 
solutions" frequently are not far from best solutions. In our case this would 
mean that a specific procedure which is best with respect to the primary 
objective, is expected to be not so much worse with respect to the secondary 
goal, for which a different procedure would be best. 
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Terminology 
a) Logical and Set Theoretical Symbols 
a = b 
a:= b 
a < b 
a << b 
n 
E a. 
i=I ~ 
n 
rr a. 
i=I ~ 
AuB 
An B 
A -........B 
f/J 
ANB:= {(a.,b.):a.EA,b.'EB} 
~ J ~ J 
X 
X = (:I) 
X 
n 
g = (Z .. ) 
~J 
a equals b 
a is defined to be equal to b 
a is smaller than b 
a is much smaller than b 
set A consists of the elements a 1 ... an 
a is element of set A 
union of sets A and B 
intersection of sets A and B 
difference of A and B 
empty set 
Cartesian product of the two sets A and B 
row vector with n components 
column vector with n components 
(transposed vector of !) 
matrix with elements Z .. q 
determinant of matrix Z 
b) Statistical and Decision Theoretical Symbols 
F(x):= prob{X ~ x} 
d f(x):= F'(x) =: dx F(x) 
X 
F(x) = J f(t)dt 
E (X) 
var(X) 
00 
distribution function of random variable X 
density function of random variable X 
distribution function of random variable X, 
expressed by the density function 
expected value of random variable X 
variance of random variable X 
cov(X,Y) 
E:= cov(X.,X.) 
= 1 J 
4>(x) 
uy 
H 
0 
Hl 
a 
ß 
c) Model Symbols 
[t , t ] 
o n 
t ,tl, •.. ,t l't o n- n 
I., i=l ... n 
1 
T., i=l. .. n 
1 
B. =I. 1+T., i=l ... n, 1 1- 1 
Z .. : = I . I +T. -I. , i = I ... n 
1 1- 1 1 
Z':= (z 1, ••• ,Zn) 
E (Z.) O, i=l ..• n 
0 1 
EI (Zi) 
M = EM . 
• 1 
1 
M., i= I ••• n 
1 
2 
cr. = var(Z.) 
1 1 
~. 
1 
z = z 
a. 1 ·~. 1+z., i=l ... n 1- 1- 1 
Z:= {Z}= {z} 
Z. cZ 
-o 
z1cz 
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covariance of random variables X and Y 
covariance matrix of random vector X 
normal distribution function 
inverse of the normal distribution function 
null hypothesis 
alternative hypothesis 
probability of error of the first kind 
(false alarm probability) 
probability of error of the second kind 
(probability of no detection) 
decision rule 
reference time 
inventory taking points of time 
physical inventory at t. 
1 
transfers between t. 1 and t. 1- 1 
book inventory at t. 
1 
expected value of z. under H 
1 0 
expected value of Zi under H1 
(note: for simplicity in Sections 1.3 and 
2.2 cr~ = var(~.), in Section 1.5 cr~ = var(Y.) 
1 1 1 1 
transformed Z., using Stewart's estimate 
1 
of the starting inventory 
observed vector of Z 
set of observations of Z 
acceptance region 
rejection region 
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